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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the future development of Swiss foreign and security policy, 
particularly in the context of the continuing trend toward alliances and cooperative 
policymaking entities in and around Europe. It focuses on two main aspects: One is how 
international cooperation in general influences national autonomy and neutrality; the 
other is the specific impact of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union on Swiss foreign, 
security, and defense policy. This two-pillar structure informs the central question of this 
thesis, namely whether increasing international cooperation is the key to Swiss national 
autonomy and Switzerland’s place in the international system of states. For outsiders, at 
first glance, this question and the whole approach may appear inherently contradictory. 
How can more or more extensive international cooperation lead to greater national 
autonomy in Swiss statecraft? It is the aim of this study to investigate and explain how 
cooperation in one political field can enhance and support autonomy in another political 
area. The thesis concludes by measuring the value of autonomy and develops some 
evolutionary options and models for future international cooperation. The final chapter 
provides an assessment of how much international cooperation is appropriate or 
recommended in light of the national and international consequences. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates the future development of Swiss foreign and security 
policy in light of the continuing trend toward alliances and cooperative policymaking 
entities in and around Europe. This work focuses on two main aspects: One is the specific 
impact of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union (EU) on Swiss foreign, security, and 
defense policy; the other is how international cooperation in general influences Swiss 
political and strategic culture of national autonomy and neutrality as such has existed for 
centuries and now faces new challenges in the present and future. This two-pillar 
structure informs the central question of this thesis, namely whether increasing 
international cooperation is the key to Swiss national autonomy and Switzerland’s place 
in the international system of states. 
Six sub-questions shape the major research question: a.) What are the future 
challenges of the Swiss foreign and security policy? b.) Which strategic factors are 
decisive in the face of these challenges? c.) What is the development potential of 
cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and security policy? d.) What is the 
strategic approach of  nation-states comparable to Switzerland? e.) What are the costs and 
benefits of autonomy and sovereignty in the system of states and a more closely linked 
global structure? f.) How might a stronger commitment by Switzerland in the formulation 
and implementation of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) enhance 
political access for the bilateral approach in the present security environment? 
For outsiders, at first glance, this question and the whole approach may appear 
inherently contradictory. How can more or more extensive international cooperation lead 
to greater national autonomy in Swiss statecraft? This study investigates and explains 
how cooperation in one political field can raise and support autonomy in another political 
area. 
Without question, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 
constitutes a milestone in European integration policy. After more than eight years of 
deliberations and discussion about revising the EU’s basic framework agreement, the 
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Treaty on EU, a new era in the EU’s history has started. At first blush, there appears to be 
no major change indicated in the carefully structured, bilateral relationship between the 
EU and Switzerland. The mutual approach, based on the “bilateral course” and 
negotiations, appears to keep its political and judicial legitimacy. 
But this appearance is deceptive. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty also heralds a new 
epoch in the EU-Swiss relationship. Generally speaking, from the Swiss perspective, the 
Lisbon Treaty serves to strengthen the position of the EU, expand the bureaucratic 
apparatus, and make the EU’s internal and external processes more complex.  The new 
EU institutions and the changes to the EU’s internal decision-making processes (for 
example, the broader sphere of competence of the central EU organizations in Brussels) 
promise to affect significantly the future development of the bilateral approach. 
There are two major challenges facing Switzerland in the near future. First, the 
international and diplomatic relationship with the EU in general, public diplomacy in 
particular, and the exertion of influence through cooperation with the different 
commissions of the EU have all become more demanding. Now the Swiss must negotiate 
a new multi-track access to the European Parliament and the EU’s other institutions and 
decision-makers. (In the past, it was much easier to deal with just one point of contact, 
the European Commission.) Second, with the entry into force and implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty, EU institutions have gained more influence, and the formal delimitations 
between the different fields of policy and responsibility have given way to the EU’s 
vision of an integrated multilateralism. This development also reduces the political 
shortcuts to Brussels and thus complicates Swiss relations with the EU, which, in turn, 
impedes the pursuit of Swiss foreign, security, and defense policy aims.1  
Hence, the current established access to the EU, mainly based on a multitude of 
discrete, individual contacts, rather than a unified approach to the EU as a single entity, is 
a model with no future—its obsolescence is built into the Lisbon Treaty. However, the 
new model shapes up, for Switzerland, the future necessarily will entail increased 
cooperation with the EU and other alliances.  Especially in terms of Swiss foreign, 
                                                
1 EDA/EVD. “Die Europapolitik der Schweiz: Der bilaterale Weg” (October 2009), accessed 
December 8, 2011, http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00499/00755/index.html?lang=de. 
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security, and defense policy, the next major question—and the topic of this thesis—is: 
Can Switzerland continue to balance national autonomy with international security 
cooperation and with increased involvement with the EU? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Further changes in the legal framework of the EU are not yet in sight. The 
integration process has reached a certain culmination point, and further steps are not 
pending on the political agenda. As a consequence for Switzerland, the Lisbon Treaty is 
the major agreement for future political definition and the development of the Swiss 
relationship to the EU. But this treaty does not really foster the old bilateral approach to 
relations between Switzerland and EU member states; instead, it actually puts some 
additional stumbling blocks on a path that is already cluttered with obstacles. 
Public relations, public diplomacy, and the exertion of influence have become 
much more demanding. Bilateral negotiations must follow more strictly the guidance and 
decisions formulated in Brussels. In addition, the EU’s institutional reform will diminish 
the willingness of the EU to endorse a special treatment of Switzerland. 
The strategic goal for Switzerland must be to improve its direct links to high-level 
opinion leaders and decision-makers in the EU. For that, the Swiss must refresh their pre-
existing contacts and prior participation in working groups in the European Commission, 
as well as establishing new associates in the Council of Europe (CE) and the European 
Parliament. Switzerland must work out a clear political roadmap covering all its national 
interests to be prepared for further negotiations with the EU. 
A three-level approach would be a feasible way to manage the political relations 
with the EU. First, an institutional political-strategic dialog with the European 
Commission would establish a certain commitment and confidence. Second, Switzerland 
must walk the talk: A stronger participation in the broad field of the CSDP would build 
up some credibility for the Swiss in other fields, including economic policy, an ace that 
would help the Swiss to protect their national interests despite certain sectorial 
disagreements. Third, the Swiss should not overplay their call for special treatment. 
Wherever possible, bilateralism must be based on existing instruments and mechanisms. 
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Special agreements between Switzerland and the EU are absolutely essential for the 
sovereign survival of Switzerland but should not become the predominant feature in a 
bilateral convention. A stronger commitment of Switzerland in the formulation and 
implementation of the CSDP would enhance political access for the bilateral approach.	  
C. HYPOTHESES 
More significant than the EU’s security and defense policy for Switzerland is 
cooperation in the field of conflict prevention, peace building, and crisis management.2 
The precise definition and the real ambitions of the EU in those tasks remain unclear. The 
ongoing discussion of the European Security Strategy (ESS) demands additional doctrinal 
strategies, especially in civil-military cooperation,3 and envisages a EU grand strategy.4 
This overarching plan is supposed to define the goals and the criteria for the deployment 
of the different CSDP instruments and should act as a planning tool for all resources and 
assets. A more transparent and generic decision-making process and criteria catalogue 
would support the commitment of third states and nongovernmental organizations to 
participate in EU-led missions and operations. Based on such a detailed strategic layout, 
Switzerland would be able to decide in which areas the EU’s policy conforms to Swiss 
national interests. Such a measure would help to provide a clear statement of how 
Switzerland intends to support the EU’s efforts. A stronger consultation and information 
exchange between the EU and Switzerland would be a basic requirement for such a 
course of action. 
To implement the new ideas, some concrete concepts and instruments must be 
developed. The whole structure of the EU itself and the treaty relationship between 
Switzerland and the EU are very complex and shaped by the huge bureaucracy in 
Brussels and by the Swiss bilateral approach. The new concept and instruments for close 
                                                
2 EDA/EVD, “Informationsblatt Friedensförderung,” February 17, 2010, accessed December 8, 2011, 
http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00499/00503/00798/ index.html?lang+de.  
3 Borja Lasheras, Christoph Pohlmann, Christos Katsioulis, and Fabio Liberti, “European Union 
Security and Defence White Paper. A Proposal,” 2010, accessed December 10, 2010, 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ ipa/07075.pdf. 
4 Jolyon Howorth, “What Europe Badly Needs is a ‘Grand Strategy,’” Europe’s World, 2009, accessed 
February 2, 2011, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ 
ArticleView/ArticleID/21474/WhatEuropebadlyneedsisaGrand-Strategy.aspx 
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cooperation in security and defense policy must follow simple principles and fulfill a 
high practical relevance to facilitate the Swiss internal political agreement process. 
In part, this study will test and investigate the different fields and options of a 
closer and more multilateral cooperation with the EU. Granted the strategic factors 
explained in Chapter II, Switzerland must improve its international engagement and 
cooperation in the broad field of the CSDP to reach its goal and to keep a high degree of 
autonomy. Hence, the question is not aye or nay to cooperation and international 
engagement in foreign and defense affairs, but rather how much and what kind of 
involvement is needed to meet and advance Swiss national interests. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A search for existing studies and findings from prior examinations of the 
implications of the Lisbon Treaty for Swiss foreign and security policy, as well as about 
how international cooperation influences national autonomy, reveals relatively few 
relevant titles. The same situation obtains in the appropriate interdisciplinary literature. 
There are four reasons for this omission. First, from the EU’s perspective, the topic of 
this study is not that politically relevant. Second, Swiss perceptions are more strongly 
oriented toward individual EU member states than toward the EU as a whole entity, in 
part because of Switzerland’s highly autonomous self-perception. These habits of thought 
can portend a crucial negative impact on Swiss foreign policy because of an 
underestimation of the EU’s significance as a collective entity. Third, Switzerland is the 
only state that consequently follows an autonomous approach in foreign, security, and 
defense policy. Fourth, the whole topic is relatively recent, and current studies about this 
overall topic are not published yet. 
With no directly relevant literature on which to base this study, the author must 
rely on contemporary literature and publications in four different but related fields. First, 
there is a lot of literature about the European integration policy and the interpretation of 
the EU’s legal framework in this particular field, primarily written by specialists on 
institutional integration and international law and strongly focused on the EU itself or 
some interaction between the EU and its member states. This literature provides a broad 
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background and some connection points. The works from Desmond5 and Carbone6 
provide excellent insights into European integration, with a special focus on the tension 
between national autonomy and multilateral cooperation. Carbone investigates the legal 
side of the Lisbon Treaty by comparing it with the constitutions of the EU member 
states,7 which has important ramifications for the Swiss case. Desmond, on the other 
hand, focuses more on the question of how close and powerful the EU is today,8 which 
parallels this thesis’ investigation of the role of Switzerland vis-à-vis the EU. The Swiss 
author Gabriel presents an overarching view of Swiss foreign policy, from the Cold War 
to the present.9 In combination with Trampusch10 and Mach’s work on the contemporary 
role of Switzerland in Europe, this volume provides the basis from which this thesis 
approach its own main question. Bindi’s volume11 on the EU’s foreign policy and the 
role of the EU in the world helps to situate the whole topic in a larger context. 
Second, there are a few contemporary works on EU security and defense policy 
(ESDP), written primarily by diplomats, civil servants, and high-ranking officers who 
work in such institutions as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the EU. The 
major topic of this literature is how the EU should shape its policy. Debates about civil 
versus military crisis management, multilateralism versus unilateralism, hard versus soft 
power, allocation of resources, cooperation between NATO and CSDP, and common 
threats are the main focuses. These sources are very helpful to any discussion of concrete 
options or models for the different forms of cooperation. The works of Jolyon Howorth12 
                                                
5 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2010), 134 et sqq. 
6 Maurizio Carbone, National Politics and European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon 
Treaty (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010), 16 et sqq. 
7 Ibid. 215 et sqq. 
8 Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 2010. 172. 
9 Gabriel Jürg Martin and Thomas Fischer, Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945−2002 (Zurich: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 35 et sqq. 
10 Christine Trampusch and André Mach (eds.), Switzerland in Europe: Continuity and Change in 
Swiss Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2011), 11 et sqq. 
11 Federiga Bindi, The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 17 et sqq. 
12 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 8 et sqq. 
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about the EU’s security and defense strategy provide an excellent frame in which to 
discuss the Swiss cooperation with the EU, even if he does not explain some 
particularities. 
Third, the most important resources for this study are the official documents 
published by the EU,13 the Swiss government,14 the “comparison cases” in the present 
analysis—Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden—and the various security studies 
institutions.15 The Lisbon Treaty,16 the bilateral treaties,17 the agreements between the 
EU and Switzerland on participation in EU crisis management missions, and the strategic 
papers provide further essential primary information for this thesis. By comparing legal 
frameworks and national memoranda, the author derives the conclusions for the Swiss 
case. 
Finally, there are very few but also very specific important studies in the field of 
cooperation and autonomy, which provide a valuable additional source. For example 
Kjell and Angström18 provide an excellent overview in their book about the approach of 
Sweden. 
In addition, this thesis provides, based on the author’s language capabilities, an 
additional resource, in its own right, as it surveys and compares English, French, German, 
and Swedish literature on this topic. This fact enlarges the potential audience for this 
thesis in the international field of security and defense policy and makes this thesis 
relevant to all who are interested in the foreign and security policy of highly autonomous 
nation states in Europe.   
 
                                                
13 EU, “European Treaties and Law,” accessed December 8, 2011, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/ 
index_en.htm. 
14 EDA/EVD, “Bilaterale Verträge,” accessed December 8, 2011, 
http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00499/00755/index.html?lang=de. 
15 International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed December 8, 2011, http://www.iiss.org/ 
publications/military-balance/. 
16 EU, “The Lisbon Treaty,” Accessed December 8, 2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
showPage.aspxlan.htm. 
17 EDA/EVD, “Bilaterale Verträge.”  
18 Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan Angström, Svensk säkerhetspolitik: i Europa och världen (Norstedts: 
Juridik, 2011). 22 et sqq. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a blended methodology of policy analysis informed by 
contemporary history as well as international affairs scholarship. The basic analytic 
approach is focused on an analysis of the historical legacies that shape the topic, focusing 
on different case studies and structured comparisons. The whole study is structured along 
the major research question and its subquestions. It is focused on different social, 
cultural, and institutional factors, and it provides a prospective timeframe from today to 
2020. 
This thesis does not rely on any specific or single international relations or 
comparative politics theory. The main focus of the study is an interdisciplinary issue 
straddling national interests, international cooperation, and strategy development, and it 
can be discussed in light of various approaches and theories, including realism, idealism, 
and constructivism. It is a mixture of the different theories that shape the future of the 
Swiss foreign and security policy, and, hence, the present analysis shifts among the 
theories in their turn. 
In order to maintain the major focus, this thesis resists addressing several aspects 
of Swiss foreign, security policy, and international cooperation. The main focus is on the 
development of the cooperation with the EU. Additional options of cooperation—for 
example, NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United 
Nations (UN), or others—are discussed only to the limited extent needed to frame the 
whole study or to present some alternatives to the cooperation with the EU. Also, the 
comparison with other states is limited to some specific topics. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is structured in five chapters. After the introduction, Chapter II 
provides an overview of the Swiss security and defense policy, analyzes selected strategic 
factors, and focuses on the future challenges as an initial analysis for the whole thesis. 
The comparative case studies in Chapter III and the examination of the relationship 
between Switzerland and the European Union in Chapter IV take up different aspects of 
the six research sub-questions. Chapter III investigates five different neutral states and 
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their security policy, drawing out some consequences for Switzerland. Chapter IV 
measures the value of autonomy from the perspective of neutral states in Europe and 
focuses on international cooperation. The final chapter assesses how much international 
cooperation is needed and explains the national and international consequences for 
Switzerland in the much-changed security environment of the early twenty-first century. 
The organization proceeds from the domestic to the international level. It first 
examines domestic particularities and determines strategic factors and then investigates 
the international dimension of cooperation. This format allows a step-by-step 
development of the cases and the research. 
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II. SWISS SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
A. FRAMEWORK AND LEGACIES 
1. Introduction 
In the international-legal sense, Switzerland is a permanent, armed neutral state 
that is also non-aligned. The roots of Switzerland’s self-imposed perpetual neutrality 
dates back to the battle of Marignano in 1515; this status became internationally 
recognized as a feature of the European system in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. For 
the duration, Switzerland has maintained armed neutrality, which means that Swiss 
armed forces exist to preserve the territorial integrity of the Confederacy. Non-alignment 
accords with the Swiss understanding of neutrality in that Switzerland, thus far, has 
remained aloof from all alliances as a matter of protecting both the letter and the spirit of 
its neutrality.  
Thanks to the enlargement of NATO and the EU since 1989, Europe can be 
characterized as stable and secure. A direct military threat in Europe is de facto 
nonexistent; even looking out over the next ten years such a conventional threat seems 
extremely unlikely. Conflicts and wars, as they still visit the continent, have shifted to 
Europe’s eastern and southern periphery. At the same time, however, the ongoing trends 
of globalization and transnational development have led to a relatively new phenomenon: 
Geographically distant conflicts and crises directly affect the security policy of European 
states and seriously threaten European state. Global terrorism and Islamist extremism 
represent the current manifestations of this development but are certainly not the only 
such concerns.  Even long-standing neutral states, including Switzerland, cannot consider 
themselves immune from the dangers that attend the contemporary world disorder. 
This change in the field of the strategic environment of the European states—
especially the neutral states—had a significant impact on the security policy and hence 
the armed forces across Europe. Starting in the early 1990s, Switzerland, like most of its 
neighbors, embarked on a major transformation of its armed forces, which continues to 
this day. At the heart of this transformation process is the evolution from a primary focus 
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on territorial defense to an embrace of the multifunctional tools of national and 
international crisis management, based on international cooperation and mutuality. Along 
with this development came structural changes like reductions in personnel and 
equipment, a clear trend toward professional versus conscription-based armies, and a 
more taskforce-oriented structure of military organizations.  
In the case of many of Europe’s neutrals, this development led to a general 
reconsideration and realignment of the concepts of neutrality toward a more cooperative 
and multilateral strategy. In this connection, the strengthened CSDP is in the center of the 
stage.  Switzerland, however, cannot and will not follow these trends, granted its legal 
and political context.  These special circumstances provide the special challenges of the 
present and future Swiss relationship with the EU. 
2. The Security Policy Framework 
Swiss security policy is articulated in the Report of the Federal Council to the 
Federal Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland—Security through Cooperation 
(Report 2000 on Security Policy) from June 1999. According to this report, the Armed 
Forces Guidelines XXI were drafted by the Federal Department of Defense, Civil 
Protection and Sport (DDPS) in 2001 in order to revise the structure and operational 
concept of the Swiss Armed Forces, as well as appropriate the training and equipment. 
Amendments to the Law on Armed Forces and the Federal Law on Civil Protection and 
Civil Defense followed as they were approved by Parliament in 2002 as well as by 
popular vote, the people referendum in 2003. The implementation of Armed Forces XXI 
began in January 2004. The major elements included a downsizing of the army in terms 
of numbers and units, a stronger focus on homeland security and crisis management 
instead of conventional defense, and some budget cuts.  Soon thereafter, changing threats 
and risks as well as budget restrictions called for a further optimization process. 
 The Federal Council decided in July 2008 to update the Report 2000 on Security 
Policy. This revision resulted in the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal 
Assembly on the Security Policy of Switzerland of 2010, the Report 2010 on Security 
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Policy, which was adopted by the Federal Council in June 2010. Submitted to Parliament, 
the Report 2010 on Security Policy will be acknowledged by the parliament in December 
2011. 
 Swiss security policy emphasizes cooperation. Domestically, national security co-
operation encompasses the Swiss instruments of security policy: foreign policy, armed 
forces, civil protection, economic policy, national economic supply, police, and the 
protection of the constitution. Second, in concert with other states and international 
organizations, Swiss policy and practice favors cooperation especially in peace support 
operations, support of humanitarian assistance operations, military training and defense 
procurement. The Report 2010 on Security Policy states that the threat to Switzerland has 
not fundamentally changed and that the current strategy will be continued. But the report 
does refine the core of Swiss security policy. 
 One major aspect is the broad view of security as concerns of all levels of Swiss 
politics: the international cooperation, the Confederation, the cantons, and the 
municipalities. An improvement of the coordination among these entities is demanded 
and a Swiss Security Network should therefore be established under the lead of the 
defense department in close association with the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs 
and the authorities of the cantons. The Report 2010 on Security Policy shifts the priorities 
for Swiss Armed Forces missions, with the emphasis now falling on support civilian 
authorities. The “classic” mission of territorial defense has become less probable, which 
means that while these capabilities must be maintained in highest quality, they will be 
reduced in quantity. The Report 2010 on Security Policy also identifies the mission of 
peace support and envisages a quantitative and qualitative enlargement of the Swiss 
Armed Forces engagement abroad. The limits on such international military co-operation 
are set by the condition that a neutral state cannot enter into any commitment that would 
require military assistance in wartime. 
 To complete the Report 2010 on Security Policy, the Report 2010 on the Armed 
Forces was initiated. It sets out the performance profile and the mandate of the Swiss 
Armed Forces and points out the parameters for its future development. Although the 
report received governmental approval in October 2010, it is planned for discussion in the 
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parliament in December 2011, especially where it touches on a political discussion of the 
procurement of new fighter planes and some ongoing debates about cuts in defense 
spending. 
 According to the Report 2010 on Security Policy, Swiss security policy aims to 
safeguard Switzerland and its population’s self-determination, integrity, and livelihood 
against direct and indirect threats and dangers, as well as to contribute to stability and 
peace beyond its borders.  Thus defined, Swiss national security, including the 
international aspects, must be preserved unilaterally or in collaboration with partners who 
share the same interests. (Of course, exact measures must be determined on a case-by-
case, depending on capabilities, costs, and chances of success.) Swiss civil and military 
contributions to stability and peace beyond national borders are consistent with Swiss 
values and lies squarely in Swiss security interests.  
3. The Political Framework and the Legal Basis for Deployment 
Engagement of the Swiss armed forces is based on the Federal Law on the Armed 
Forces and Military Administration (Law on the Armed Forces; SR 510.10). Military 
engagement takes the legal form of peace-support service, assistance service, or active 
service. In peace-support or assistance service, members of the armed forces can be 
engaged abroad. Professional military personnel can be contracted for other deployments 
abroad. For militia personnel, participation on missions abroad is voluntary. 
Assistance service for disaster-relief engagements abroad (according to Article 69 
of the Law on the Armed Forces) may only follow a request from a disaster-affected state 
or an international organization for the benefit of victims. The procedure is regulated in a 
special statute for disaster relief abroad. Engagements abroad are usually unarmed. 
Participation in disaster-relief operations abroad is generally voluntary but can be 
declared obligatory if such service is rendered in areas close to the Swiss border. Bilateral 
agreements for disaster relief exist with Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
Principality of Liechtenstein. 
Article 69, Paragraph 2 of the Law on the Armed Forces provides the legal basis 
for assistance service abroad in the event that Swiss interests, such as the integrity of 
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Swiss citizens or Swiss diplomatic property in a foreign country, are challenged. The 
Federal Council determines the level and scope of armament for the members of such a 
task force. In June 2006 the Federal Statute regarding the “Assignments of Troops for the 
Protection of Individuals and Properties Abroad” entered into force. This law, together 
with the “Law on the Armed Forces” and the Parliamentary statute on the “Organization 
of the Swiss Armed Forces,” provides the legal basis to, train, equip, and prepare 
members of the Armed Forces Reconnaissance Detachment and Military Security. These 
missions abroad focus on protecting the personnel of Swiss embassies as well as rescuing 
and repatriating individual persons (members of the Swiss Armed Forces and civilians). 
Article 65a of the Law on the Armed Forces stipulates that participation in peace-
support operations or assistance service abroad may be added to the total number of 
service days to be served. As a rule, this provision applies only to service performed 
without a contract on salary basis.19 Also, the deployment for each such mission, 
especially in peace-support operations, is, as a general rule, performed under an 
employment contract according to the federal law on federal personnel and thus does not 
count toward a soldier’s compulsory military service. 
For assistance-service missions within Switzerland, the Federal Assembly or the 
DDPS can call up elements of the armed forces. If more than 2,000 members of the 
armed forces are called up for assistance service or if the mission is expected to last 
longer than three weeks, the Federal Assembly must approve the mission during its next 
session. If the mission is completed before the Federal Assembly convenes, the Federal 
Council has to report (Article 70, Paragraph 2 of the Law on Armed Forces). 
The whole spectrum of defense against terrorism is not defined militarily. That is, 
there are no military forces specifically designated to combat terrorist threats. In 
Switzerland, combating terrorism in the context of domestic security is primarily a 
civilian task for the police, legal authorities and the Federal Intelligence Service. It is part 
of preventive and repressive measures in the framework of national security. Prevention 
and, at least partially, the combating of terrorism are settled in the Federal Act about 
                                                
19 In the Swiss Armed Forces two major approaches of service are distinguished. First, the reserve or 
militia system based on drafted citizen soldiers who are obliged to serve during several weeks per year; and 
second the permanent but very small professional component. 
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Measures to Safeguard Internal Security of 21 March 1997 (SR 120). However, in case of 
a major terrorist event, the armed forces can support the civil authorities, if such 
assistance is requested by the civilian authorities and approved by the Federal Council 
and the Federal Assembly. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation addressing the security 
of Swiss airspace and non-military threats Switzerland exist with France, Germany, Italy, 
and Austria. A “Letter of Intent” on cross-border cooperation was signed between 
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (17 October 2006). The agreement mainly focuses on 
training and development of common procedures and processes in crisis management of 
strategic incidents (i.e. terrorist attacks), disaster relief and of major events. Finally, since 
1 January 2010, Switzerland holds the chairmanship of the Committee of Experts on 
Terrorism (CODEXTER) of the CE. 
According to the Law on the Armed Forces, Swiss military personnel can be 
deployed abroad only if the mission takes place under a mandate from either the UN or 
the OSCE. The law expressly prohibits participation of Swiss Armed Forces personnel in 
combat activities for peace enforcement. For members of the Swiss Armed Forces, 
participation in peace-support operations is voluntary. For armed missions, the Federal 
Council must consult the Commission on Foreign Policy and the Commission on Security 
Policy. If the deployment involves more than 100 members of the armed forces or if the 
operation lasts longer than three weeks, it requires parliamentary approval (Article 66b, 
Para 4 of the Law on the Armed Forces). A non-parliamentary commission advises the 
DDPS and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs on political and conceptual issues 
concerning the deployment of Swiss military personnel and units in international peace-
support operations. The participation of Swiss troops in fighting actions for peace 
enforcement is not allowed (Art. 66a, para 2, of the Law on the Armed Forces).  
The point is that Switzerland can and does participate in various military missions 
around the world.  Indeed, the Swiss Armed Forces were involved in International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—with a maximum of four officers armed for self-
defense—for four years. After the decision of the Federal Council of 16 April 2003, and 
in accordance with applicable legislation, the Swiss Parliament gave its consent for this 
mission in the summer session of 2003. The UN resolutions 1386, 1510, 1659, and 1776 
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formed the legal basis for this decision. A total of thirty-one officers, served in Kabul, 
Kunduz, and Faizabad. In Kunduz Swiss nationals served as liaison officers for the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Their task was comparable to that of military 
observers. Switzerland’s engagement was in response to a request of NATO that, on 15 
November 2002, had decided to lend support to the leading ISAF III nations (Germany 
and the Netherlands) in their process of compiling forces. The deployment of Swiss 
officers formed the logical continuation of Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan in 
various sectors. From March 2002 to July 2005, the DDPS provided various mine experts 
and logistic advisers for the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) as well 
as supervisors for the Swiss Federation for Mine Action Clearance Project (SFMA). 
Through its support of the ISAF with military specialists, Switzerland demonstrated its 
increased solidarity with international efforts to establish stability and security according 
to the motto of security through cooperation.20  
There are limits, however, as the legal framework makes clear.  In November 
2007, Federal Councilor Samuel Schmid decided to recall the Swiss servicemen from 
ISAF by the end of February 2008. To explain his decision he pointed out that the two 
Swiss military persons stationed last in Kunduz had barely been able to effectively fulfill 
their mission because, in the changing situation, the forces had increasingly been 
occupied with self-protection measures.  Such actions threatened to implicate Switzerland 
in fighting that exceeded the tolerances of Swiss neutrality as well as its domestic laws.21 
B. SELECTED STRATEGIC FACTORS 
1. Introduction 
The development in the world and especially Europe in the second decade of the 
new century shows that the future security challenges for Switzerland are not the 
overwhelming power or even a direct or indirect threat of a state but the inability of 
                                                
20 Bundesamt für Verteidigung Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport,“Peace Support World Wide 




certain regions, countries, and associated states to provide stability and security. Because 
of disintegration and failure of states or regional and supranational destabilization, 
economic and, hence, humanitarian crises spring up, which can end in civil wars, mass 
migrations, and political radicalization in general. This development supports national 
and international terrorism, organized crime and the emergence of a regional or supra-
regional power vacuum. These trends jeopardize the stability of Europe with devastating 
consequences for the security of Switzerland because of its direct economical 
dependency and geographical proximity. A partial collapse of Europe or even just a 
failure of the Eurozone is currently the most dangerous and most likely threat to 
Switzerland’s prosperity and stability. 
Growing global intercommunication fosters the fast dissemination and use of high 
technology like information, alternative energy, and chemical technologies. These 
technologies involve a high potential for economic growth but also the risk for abuse. 
High technology may trigger political developments by the purposeful dissemination of 
information, the option of an efficient allocation of resources, and the improvement  
of the health of the population. This dynamic generally leads to more enlightened and 
hence more democratized societies. But the potential of political and economic abuse  
is a drawback of the whole development. Governmental and non-governmental  
organizations and players can use the same features for disinformation, radicalization, 
and destabilization of societies and states. 
Information, information exchange, and information infrastructure are perhaps the 
most critical items of society from the point of view of the option of destabilizing the 
society. Selective or universal influencing of information has an enormous impact on the 
national security of a state and especially of Switzerland because of its large 
representation of mainly information, based service industries. Interstate conflicts in the 
field of critical and illegal information trade, industrial espionage and cyber attacks are an 
increasing threat to wealthy states. A significant part of a modern democratic state’s 





geographical borders do not exist for technical networks, the defense against such attacks 
has to be based on mutual cooperation with other states as part of a complete security 
strategy. 
Another rising threat for Europe and Switzerland is the proliferation of means and 
weapons of mass destruction. It must be part of a comprehensive security strategy to 
avert that governmental and non-governmental actors enter into illegal possession of 
means of mass destruction such as biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. For this 
reason it must be part of the strategy to control the stream of cash of nondemocratic states 
and terroristic organizations, to watch over the spread of technology, and to support an 
international counter-proliferation policy. In addition, participation in an internationally 
established early warning system as well as countermeasure capabilities in different areas 
are a transnational obligation. 
Climate changes have reached an existence-threatening dimension in Switzerland 
and abroad. The desolation of land, the spread of the desert, water scarcity, the melting of 
glaciers and permafrost, and the regional and supra-regional shortage of arable land leads 
to crop failure, resettlements, problematic population density, migrations and hence 
wealth gaps with the danger of social disturbances and conflicts. This situation fosters the 
development of worldwide migration movements toward geographically and 
economically more privileged regions like for example Switzerland and Central Europe. 
The consequence is an increased risk of conflicts for these regions. 
A prosperous export market to the European Union is a vital factor for the 
economic wealth of Switzerland. Along with this goes the requirement to have access to 
the secure commercial routes on land, air and sea, to assure the supply of resources and 
the distribution of freights. The development of and access to resources, channels of 
distribution, and markets will be completely redistributed because of new opportunities 
for example, the navigability of the Bering Strait. The scarcity of resources in general 




increases the threat of terror attacks, piracy, and sabotage of transportation lines and 
communications as well as the infrastructure of energy distribution, particularly gas, oil 
and electricity. 
To summarize, the main threats for Switzerland and hence for the continuity of its 
non-alignment are risks and challenges that cannot be solved by the nation itself. The 
character of today’s global challenges, with a high potential for regional and supra-
regional conflicts, does not observe geographical borders or national institutions.  As 
such, Switzerland, like all Europe’s neutral states, must address these new challenges and 
its interrelations with its neighbors and partners in terms of its strategic requirements and 
the demands of neutrality. 
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III. COMPARING SWITZERLAND WITH FOUR CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates and compares the security and defense policy reforms of 
Europe’s neutral states since 1990 and the impact of these reforms on the transformation 
of the armed forces in each state. The test case, so to speak, is Switzerland, as this 
comparison is meant to illuminate the particular challenges of defense and security 
reform in the Swiss Confederacy. The comparative cases are those of Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, and Sweden, the larger European neutrals.22 The study is limited to these five 
cases because the other international recognized neutral states in Europe do not maintain 
military forces.23 
Overall, the changes within the international system of states since the end of the 
Cold War have placed pressure on the neutral states of Europe as they grapple with 
security policy reform. The similarities and differences in national experiences 
underscore these pressures and provide some context for the Swiss future foreign and 
security policy in general and its politics of neutrality in particular. 
A detailed analysis of the current structure and characteristics of the different 
investigated armed forces is presented in the third part of this chapter. The following 
section focuses on the definition and state-specific concepts of neutrality.  
 
                                                
22 This chapter is mainly based on the state-specific white papers and strategy papers, annual security 
policy reports, and governmental documents about the development of the security policy and the reforms 
of the armed forces. The comparability of security policy data and strategic concepts is, to a certain extent, 
limited because of the divergent national contexts and interpretation by the particular states them selves. 
Therefore, this study is not based on a specific data set, like for example, the statistics provided by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because an overly numbers-loaded approach 
limits the analysis and lacks an overall perspective. Security policy and military strategy cannot be 
investigated by the approach of an auditor. 
23 Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Vatican City. 
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B. DEFINITION AND CONCEPTS OF NEUTRALITY 
According to international law, neutrality can be generally defined as not 
participating in wars between other states and nonalignment with belligerents. Because of 
the mutual assistance clauses of different security and defense alliances—for example, 
NATO or CSDP—the participation of neutral states in such coalitions is debatable. 
The duties and rights of internationally recognized neutral states are defined in the 
Hague Convention of 1907. Austrian, Finnish, Irish, Swedish and Swiss concepts of 
neutrality are influenced by historical legacies and current national interests. The 
understanding and implementation of neutrality in the five states are inherently different. 
Two main differences in the concepts of neutrality are permanent versus temporary 
neutrality or in other words peacetime versus wartime neutrality, and the policy of 
participation in international alliances. Austria, Finland, and Ireland interpret their 
neutrality relatively loosely, while Sweden adheres to stricter principles of neutrality. 
However, Switzerland practices the most absolute model of permanent neutrality. 
The following sections provide a brief overview of the different forms of neutrality 
and explain state-specific peculiarities. 
 
 Austria 
Austria regained state autonomy ten years after World War II and became neutral. 
Because of Austria’s central role in Nazi Germany after the Anschluss in 1938, the Allies 
de facto imposed neutrality on Austria. The Soviet Union also made neutrality a 
condition for ending Allied occupation of Austria in 1955. That same year, Austria joined 
the UN, which on the one hand, shows Austria’s early commitment to participating in 
international organizations and, on the other hand, its relatively loose interpretation of 
neutrality in comparison, to say Switzerland.24  
                                                
24 During the Cold War Austria’s neutrality played a major role because of its geopolitical situation on 
the east-west divide.  The Austrian capital, Vienna, actually lies further east than the Czech capital of 
Prague, then officially part of the East bloc.  Neutral Austria thus served as a favored site of official and 
unofficial contacts between the superpowers.  It also attracted nonaligned powers from elsewhere in the 
world, looking to establish a presence in Europe—for example, OPEC has its headquarters in Vienna. 
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Austria sees its neutrality as subsidiary to international solidarity and burden-
sharing within collective security in the classical sense, which is one reason for its long 
tradition of participating in international peacekeeping operations, not only on the 
European continent but also in Africa and the Middle East. Austria’s international 
understanding of security policy shows that its neutrality is more of a political ideology  
of post 1945 Austrian national identity as a foundation for Austria’s foreign policy than 
the core of a sovereign security and defense policy. 
In 1995, Austria joined the EU and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). By 
adopting the EU’s legal framework, it fully committed itself to the predecessor of CSDP 
and completed its strategy of European integration and solidarity. In this regard, Austria 




Finland became neutral by self-declaration after it gained independence from 
Russia in 1917. But as a former part of the Russian empire, it fought twice during World 
War II against the Soviet Union to maintain its sovereignty and to survive as an 
independent state. After the war, Finland signed the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA) treaty with the Soviet Union, making territorial concessions to 
Russia and allowing a Soviet military base on Finish territory. In addition Finland 
acquiesced to Moscow’s demand not to participate in the Marshall Plan.25 
Finland’s politics during the Cold War were characterized by ambivalence toward 
West and East. The fear that every rapprochement to Western institutions could be 
misunderstood by the Soviet Union—and hence threaten Finish sovereignty—was 
omnipresent. The policy of Finland vis-à-vis Russia, also known as Finlandization, rested 
on this existential decision not to challenge Russia as a powerful neighbor in foreign and 
security policy but, instead, to maintain national sovereignty and a strong defense based 
military forces.26 
                                                
25 Finland’s Neutrality. http://countrystudies.us/finland/137.htm. accessed December 5, 2011 
26 Ibid. 
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Finland’s adamant neutrality was one reason among many that the Soviets to 
withdrew from their military base in 1955. The Finish accession to the UN in the same 
year led to an international opening for Finland. Finland’s neutrality was internationally 
recognized in 1960.  
During the Cold War, Finland championed a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
(NWFZ) to avoid nuclear attacks in a potential escalation between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. But because Denmark and Norway became NATO members, the NWFZ 
became a toothless tiger. Driven by the threat of Russia and the fear that, in the event of a 
nuclear war, Finland would became a main nuclear war theater, Finland continued to 
campaign for nuclear disarmament and arms control and played a major role in the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).27 
 
 Ireland 
Ireland is an internationally recognized neutral state. But strikingly, the Irish 
constitution does not enshrine neutrality in the law of the land. Irish neutrality dates back 
to the late nineteenth century. Amid a potential war between Britain and Spain, the 
United Irishmen brought up the idea to establish a united, independent, neutral Irish 
Republic. In the twentieth century, Ireland’s neutrality was mainly defined by remaining 
neutral during World War II, the Cold War, and other recent conflicts.  
In 1955, Ireland joined the UN, and since the sixties, it has participated in UN-led 
peacekeeping missions in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Ireland has been a EU 
member state since 1973. The compatibility of Ireland’s neutrality with its membership in 
the EU was debated in the EU treaty referendum campaigns in Ireland in 2008, and 
because the first ratification failed, its entry into the Lisbon Treaty was delayed for more 
than a year;28 ultimately, the issue was resolved by the introduction of what is commonly 
known as the Irish clause in the Lisbon Treaty. On the one hand, this turn of events 
demonstrates that Ireland, which is already in an early stage of European integration, 
                                                
27 Finland’s Neutrality. http://countrystudies.us/finland/137.htm. 
28 Irish Neutrality: A Future? 2009. http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/GSLR/2010/Vol4GSLR%20-
%20Egan.pdf, accessed December 8, 2011. 
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decided to participate more fully in the EU. On the other hand, it shows that the insular 
state approaches the requirements of European law with certain skepticism, especially 
regarding its own security policy and neutrality.29 
Ireland’s neutrality has some other particularities. One is its open policy toward 
foreign troops within its territory. During the Cold War and various military operations 
against terror in the aftermath of 9/11, Ireland authorized transit flights and ground 
refueling of foreign military aircraft—measures that would represent unthinkable 
breaches of neutrality to Swiss thinking.  
 
 Sweden 
In contrast to Switzerland, Swedish neutrality is not perpetual. Because of 
Sweden’s challenging situation during World War I and World War II—with both its 
sovereignty and security under pressure—as well as for economic reasons, Sweden had to 
adapt its neutrality during the wars. For example, it granted transit rights to German 
troops, which was not neutral at all. (Switzerland, for example, denied the Germans such 
passage.) Sweden did manage to press some of the prerogatives of neutrality during 
World War II, inasmuch as its armed forces remained out of the fighting.  In peacetime, 
however, the Swedes seemed more interested in “neutrality” as non-alignment beyond, 
perhaps, some regional engagement. 
In 1946, Sweden joined the UN and, in parallel, joined the discussion of a Nordic 
defense alliance, which ended with the accession of Denmark and Norway to NATO 
membership. Sweden’s policy of non-alliance continued until 1995, when it became a 
member of the EU. For Sweden its accession to the EU was fully compatible with its 
understanding of neutrality because Sweden’s commitment to the EU is mainly 
economic. Unlike Ireland, the Swedes had no issue in the membership referendum in 
1995 or during the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
 
                                                
29 Irish Neutrality: A Future? 2009. http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/GSLR/2010/Vol4GSLR%20-
%20Egan.pdf , accessed December 8, 2011. 
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 Switzerland 
Switzerland’s understanding of neutrality outlaws any participation in security or 
defense alliances during peacetime or war. Thus, neutrality in Swiss history has 
necessitated an autonomous security and defense policy and, hence, relatively strong 
armed forces. In the event, Switzerland has avoided war on its soil for more than 150 
years. Amid such success, the political and economic elite, as well as Swiss citizens, 
associate very closely and positively with neutrality. Due to its neutrality, Switzerland 
was highly esteemed as a diplomatic intermediary during the Cold War and became a 
popular state for the head offices of international organizations. 
Indeed, although several major UN offices and institutions are at home in Geneva 
and elsewhere in the country, Switzerland resisted joining the UN itself until 2002, 
following a referendum on the question of membership and neutrality. Similarly, 
Switzerland has become a member of neither the EU nor NATO.  
Despite a certain loosening of the Swiss understanding of neutrality in recent 
years—demonstrated by Swiss participation in different peace building missions led by 
the UN, PfP and OSCE—the Swiss really have not adapted neutrality to the changed 
international security environment since the end of the Cold War. For Switzerland, 
neutrality is still a reliable concept that meets the goals of its national interests in a 
globalized world, and it has never been fundamentally questioned.  
C. ARMED FORCES TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
In view of the changed security environment in Europe since 1990, a 
transformation process of the armed forces was inevitable. The major development is the 
paradigm shift of the armed forces from territorial defense to multifunctional tools for 
national and international crisis management.  This transition of the security policy and 
military forces in the European region was and is not unexpected; nor is it a linear 
process. Instead, multifactorial national and international subjects, not least triggered by 
the state finances, shape it. Nevertheless there are some general multinational trends that 
describe how reforms in security affairs develop and how the armed forces tend to 
transform. 
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In essence, there were three waves of reforms. The first reforms were initiated in 
the early nineties, mainly motivated by cost-cutting measures, which led to a quantitative 
reduction of the armed forces. The gigantic military apparatus of the Cold War was just 
too expensive. Nonetheless, no major strategic realignments were made during the first 
wave. The principle of the “mass army” remained the same, but personnel and materiel 
were reduced.30 
In the middle of the 1990s, the second reform phase was initiated. This period led 
to a reorganization of the security apparatus and changed and extended the spectrum of 
tasks for the armed forces. One of the main reasons for this development was the need for 
advanced international cooperation, for example in the Balkan wars and with states of the 
former Warsaw Pact.  Emerging states at the eastern periphery of Europe, as well as the 
non-aligned and neutral states of northern and central Europe, commenced their 
cooperation within the framework of PfP, motivated by maintaining peace and stability in 
the post-Cold War Europe. The shift in NATO’s strategy to commit troops in peace 
building operations provided a new dimension to Europe’s neutral state. By joining PfP, 
the neutral states had the opportunity to actively shape peace and stability in Europe, 
without infringing neutrality. International peace-building operations require high 
standards in interoperability. Synchronization of the doctrine and the joint planning and 
command capabilities are key to successful cooperation. This development led to a 
realignment of national security strategies and a “rightsizing” of the structure of the 
armed forces. Consequently, the professionalization of the armed forces and a related 
cost-driven downsizing ensued.31 
The third phase of reforms started at the turn of the millennium and is still 
ongoing. It is mainly driven by the experiences and lessons learned from the peace-
building operation of the early years of international cooperation. The main goal is 
                                                
30 Transformation moderner Streitkräfte – Warum, wofür, wohin, wie? 2011. 
http://www.globaldefence.net/artikel-analysen/1218-transformation-moderner-streitkraefte-warum-wofuer-
wohin-wie.html, accessed December 8, 2011. 
31 Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräftetransformation in kleineren europäischen Staaten – die 
Fallbeispiele Niederlande, Dänemark und Schweden. 2006. http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/tgt_Niederlande_D_nemark_Schweden_formatiert_ks
.pdf, accessed December 8, 2011. 
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enhancing the efficiency of crisis management in a globalized world, including a high 
standard of modularization and flexibility of the armed forces to meet the requirements 
for the current challenges in peace-building and crisis management. (The modular 
organization of armed forces shortens the response time and improves international task 
forcing capabilities.) The ongoing high-tech trend in the field of procurement financially 
challenged the third-wave transformation and led to additional reductions in personnel in 
order to afford state-of-the-art military technology.32 
The foregoing explanations oft the general trend in armed forces transformation in 
Europe since the end of the Cold War do not apply to every state equally. However, this 
discussion provides a structure by which to analyze the reforms and transformation in 
security policy and military forces of European neutral states Austria, Finland, Ireland, 
Sweden, and Switzerland have all shifted their national security strategies toward 
stronger international cooperation, though they each follow different approaches and 
priorities. Sharing the label of neutrality does not indicate that they share their national 
security strategies. Neutrality and the absence of the NATO alliance impose certain 
parallels that also lead to distinctive differences, shaped by geopolitical factors, political 
institutions and different systems of democracy, socio-political factors, and financial 
parameters, as the following sections illustrate.  
 
 Austria 
Austria’s conception of neutrality is based on its geopolitical environment during 
the Cold War. Austria could be seen as a buffer zone between the West and the East, 
although in reality, the Warsaw Pact planned to over run this neutral nation in the event 
of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war. 
With the end of the Cold War Austria’s  geopolitical situation changed from the 
frontier to the center of Europe once more. Upon the opening of the borders to the eastern 
states, Austria became a highly frequented transit state for refugees from the east, and its 
proximity to the Balkans led to new threats from the southeast with resonances of the 
                                                
32 Transformation moderner Streitkräfte – Warum, wofür, wohin, wie? 2011. 
http://www.globaldefence.net/artikel-analysen/1218-transformation-moderner-streitkraefte-warum-wofuer-
wohin-wie.html, accessed December 8, 2011. 
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past. This changed security environment motivated Austria to reconsider its foreign and 
security strategy, which ended in its accession to the EU in 1995.33 This step more or less 
ended Austria’s international-legal neutrality, though the country retains a political 
culture of peaceful resolution of conflict, although it has now a record of security 
building operations in ex-Yugoslavia via international organizations.  Indeed, during the 
accession negotiations, the aspect of neutrality was mainly factored out. Austria stated 
that it was willing to follow the guidelines of the CSDP. From Austria’s point of view, 
the CSDP could be agreed to without any caveats because the EU grants a veto right to 
the security policy concerns of its member states.34 
Based on its EU membership and the deployment of the armed forces for border 
control during the Balkan wars, the reform of the security policy and the transformation 
of the armed forces have been accelerated. The Heeresgliederung 92 strategy paper 
abandoned the concept of territorial defense, and the army was reduced from 240,000 to 
150,000. The reorganization implemented a brigade structure to achieve more flexibility 
in deploying troops. This reform implicated a new concept of operation focused on 
national and international crisis management.35 
In the early nineties Austria concluded that its future security policy challenges 
will be in foreign areas. Thus, it adopted the so-called concept of VOREIN, which 
governs future participation in international missions based on UN mandates. The 
additional intention to participate in PfP activities was a further step toward strengthened 
international cooperation.36 
                                                
33 Die Entwicklung der militärstrategischen Konzeptionen des Österreichischen Bundesheeres von 
1955 bis 2005. 2005. http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=302, accessed December 8, 
2011. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
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To prevent conflicts of law due to its neutrality, Austria adapted its constitution 
and incorporated the Petersberg Tasks37 and the additional requirements demanded by the 
CSDP. This change led to Austria’s renunciation of permanent neutrality, though it 
retains an express affinity for its cultural “neutrality,” typically understood in a no to 
manipulation by larger, outside powers.  The realignment of Austria’s security policy in 
the 1990s marked a huge step toward the EU and international cooperation but did not 
include a NATO accession, although Austria has been deeply involved in NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace. NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in the mid and later 1990s 
reinvigorated the political debate about neutrality and made joining NATO virtually 
impossible. But this controversy did not hamper Austria’s international participation in 
peace-enforcement and peacekeeping mission in the Balkan Wars of 1995 and 1999. 
Austria’s international engagement became very common. The structure of the 
armed forces answers this development in the Heeresgliederung 98 by implementing a 
new headquarters and special command for international missions. In addition to that the 
head-count was reduced from 150,000 to 110,000. This trend confirmed the turning away 
from territorial defense toward national and international crisis management in 
cooperation with the European alliance.38 
An overarching top-down approach did not trigger the transformation of the 
Austrian armed forces with a growing role for security building missions out of the 
country versus traditional territorial defense. It followed a more bottom-up concept, 
which pragmatically developed the requirements to meet the challenges of security policy 
of the nineties. In 2000, the Austrian government started to review development between 
1989 and 1999. The result ended in a National Security and Defense Doctrine, which the 
                                                
37  The "Petersberg Tasks" are an integral part of the European security and defense policy (ESDP). 
They were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17). The Treaty of Lisbon (Article 
42 of the TEU) complements the range of missions, which may be carried out in the name of the European 
Union (EU). From now on, they cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, joint disarmament 
operations, military advice and assistance tasks, post-conflict stabilisation tasks. These tasks were set out in 
the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in 
June 1992. On that occasion, the WEU Member States declared their readiness to make available to the 
WEU, but also to NATO and the European Union, military units from the whole spectrum of their 
conventional armed forces. 
38 Österreichisches Bundesheer. Landesverteidigungsrat empfiehlt neue Heeresgliederung, 1998. 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/cms/artikel.php?ID=1591, accessed December 8, 2011. 
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parliament adopted in 2001.39 The EU and its CSDP play a central role in the entire 
concept. The security of Austria and the EU are inseparably linked.  
The doctrine of Austria’s security strategy assesses the risks and threats for the 
state between the Rhine and Danube, not between states, but in the field of domestic 
conflicts of its neighbor countries and the danger of a spillover effect on Austria. The 
threats of terrorism and domestic disaster relief have another important impact on its 
national security strategy. Based on this development, Austria follows a consequent 
strategy of international cooperation to the disadvantage of its neutrality.  
Both to meet the requirements of the caveats of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) and to have the means to react to the current threats, Austria 
launched a reform commission in 2004 to establish a concept for the future development 
of the armed forces. The guidance based on this concept included a reduction of the head 
count to 55,000 and a rearrangement of the resources for the benefit of the international 
cooperation.40 In addition, Austria decided to provide 3,500 soldiers to the European 
reaction forces and 200 soldiers to participate in the EU Battle Group.41 
Beside the developments in Austria’s security policy toward strong international 
cooperation its territorial defense, policy is established in its constitution. Hence a 
definitive renunciation from the defense capabilities entailed an adjustment of the 
constitution. There are limits to this change, however, based on Austrian political 
sensibilities and the Austrians sense of their own past. In this connection, the Social 
Democrats (SPÖ) insist that the option of NATO accession will not be mentioned in the 
upcoming security strategy of 201142 Furthermore, Austria has retained its conscription 
                                                
39 Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin vom Nationalrat beschlossen, 2001. 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/cms/artikel.php?ID=2081, accessed December 8, 2011. 
40 Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung. ÖBH 2010: Die Realisierung, 2005. 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/facts/management_2010/pdf/dierealisierung.pdf, accessed December 8, 2011. 
41 An EU Battle Group (BG) is a military unit adhering to CSDP of the EU. Often based on 
contributions from a coalition of member states, each of the eighteen Battle Groups consists of a battalion-
sized force (1,500 troops) reinforced with combat support elements. The groups rotate actively, so that two 
are ready for deployment at all times. The forces are under the direct control of an unanimous European 
Council (heads of state, or often heads of government of countries where the head of state is largely a 
symbolic position, of member states) of the EU. 
42 Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung. ÖBH 2010: Die Realisierung, 2005. 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/facts/management_2010/pdf/dierealisierung.pdf. 
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system, and, thus, a relatively small professional component—a move that distinguishes 
Austria from most of its neighbors except Switzerland. 
 
 Finland 
In 1990, Finland declared and end to the provision of the Paris Peace Agreement 
of 1947, which limited Finland’s sovereignty. Finland’s release from the legacies of the 
Cold War led to a reevaluation of its security policy and the reform of its military 
apparatus and concept of territorial defense. In 1992, Finland limited its neutrality to the 
core of an alliance-free defense but signaled a strong interest in international cooperation. 
In 1995, Finland joined the EU at the same time that Sweden did. This step was primarily 
economically motivated. Finland also was convinced that its active participation in the 
EU would help to shape Europe’s future and hence maintains its own national 
sovereignty.  
Also, in the early nineties Finland signed onto PfP. However, it did not request 
NATO membership because it saw itself in a more established situation than the new 
emerging states in the east, for example, the Baltic States. In contrast to Finland, these 
newcomers had to prove their commitment to the west. Meanwhile, Finland remained 
leery of provoking Russia by joining NATO. 
Unlike most of the other neutral states in Europe, Finland kept its strong territorial 
defense capabilities and approached international cooperation using the concept of “the 
best of both strategies.”43 In the first phase of reform, Finland reduced its standing army 
by about 200,000, to 500,000; and in a further step, the Finish armed forces were drawn 
down to 430,000 by 2008.44 From the beginning, Finland participated in international 
missions, which led to great prestige in the CSDP of the EU.  
The entire Finish transformation after the Cold War was shaped in three main 
strategy concepts. The so-called Finish Security and Defense Policy Report, which was 
                                                
43 The “best of both strategies” means to keep the core competences in the conventional defense 
concept of the Cold War on one hand but to develop additional competences in peace-keeping and crisis 
management missions, on the other hand. 
44 Prime Minister’s Office. Finish Security and Defence Policy 2001, Report by the Government to 
Parliament, 2001. http://www.defmin.fi/files/1149/InEnglish.pdf. accessed December 8, 2011. 
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first published in 2001, was followed by two additional reports in 2004 and 2009.45 All 
the reports confirm a strong commitment to territorial defense and international 
cooperation, while the national defense component is clearly prioritized and will stay the 
pillar of Finland’s armed forces because of its historical experiences and proximity to 
Russia. Nevertheless, Finland is strongly committed to several security institutions like 
CSDP, NATO/PfP, and the Nordic Defense Cooperation and continues to maintain a 
strong military force, today numbering about 300,000. 
 
 Ireland 
In the European security architecture Ireland is and was an exception. Compared 
to Finland and Austria, during the Cold War, Ireland was, from a geostrategic point of 
view, not that important due to its relative military weakness and a lack of natural 
resources. This circumstance allowed Ireland to keep its defense spending low. The end 
of the Cold War had no major impact on Ireland’s security policy. In comparison to the 
other four states, Ireland never questioned the compatibility of neutrality and European 
integration. Nevertheless, the changes in the European security environment had a certain 
impact on Ireland’s security policy. Because of globalization and the increase of 
transnational conflicts, Ireland initiated a stronger commitment to the UN. 
The main impact on the development of Ireland’s security policy was the Good 
Friday Agreement46 in 1998 between the Republic of Ireland, Great Britain, and Northern 
Ireland. This peak in the Irish peace process reduced the internal threat of terror because 
of the Northern Irish Conflict and opened new opportunities for the armed forces in the 
field of international peace building. 
In order to be prepared for international cooperation Ireland joined the PfP in 
1999. It participated in the NATO-mission in Bosnia, Stabilization Force (SFOR) and 
Kosovo, Kosovo Force (KFOR). The paradigm shift from domestic deployment to 
international engagement initiated a restructuring of the Irish armed forces in the late 
                                                
45 Prime Minister’s Office. Finish Security and Defence Policy 2004, Report by the Government to 
Parliament, 2004. http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_2160_English_With_paper_2004_1_.pdf.  
46 The Belfast Agreement, alternatively and widely known as the Good Friday Agreement, and 
occasionally as the Stormont Agreement, was a major political development in the Northern Ireland peace 
process. 
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nineties. This reform was mainly organizational; it reduced the infrastructure and 
modernized equipment. New training facilities for peace building missions have been 
erected and the equipment was adapted to meet international standards. 
In 2000, the one and so far only white paper on Irish defense was published. It 
shares the threat assessment of the other neutral states in Europe and highlights the 
impact of refugee flows on Ireland. The main tasks for the armed forces are defined by 
national defense, support of domestic police forces, and international peace building. 
International cooperation was established as the core task. In the 2000 white paper, the 
legal framework for participation, in EU and NATO led missions were added; a UN-
mandate is still required and Ireland made a strong commitment to the CSDP.47 
The Irish defense minister confirmed this security and defense policy in 2003, in 
the Strategy Statement 2003–2005. In the threat assessment, the dimension of 
international terrorism has been added and other important statements like the so called 
“triple lock” decision making process, which emphasizes that a mandate of the UN 
mandate is mandatory for Irish participation in international operations. Ireland provides 
850 soldiers to the EU in fulfillment of the Petersberg Tasks.48 
In the 2007 review of implementation of the White Paper on Defense, Ireland 
stated that the security strategy remains unchanged. Ireland steadily approved its 
commitment for international peace building operations, for example, by the participating 
in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the PfP and its commitment to Nordic 
Battle Groups under the lead of Sweden. The Irish contribution to the CSDP is not a 
reason to question Irish military neutrality. In an official document, named Strategy 
Statement 2008–2010, Ireland adhered to its internationalization strategy.49 The 
announced white book for the timeframe 2011–2020 will not bring major reforms. But 
                                                
47 Departement of Defence. White Paper on Defence, 2000. http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Ireland-
2000.pdf. accessed December 8, 2011. 
48 The Petersberg tasks cover a great range of possible military missions, ranging from the most 
simple to the most robust military intervention. They are formulated as: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
Peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 
49 Department of Defence and Defence Forces. Strategy Statement 2008–2010. 2008. 
http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/fba727373c93a4f080256c53004d976e/a221c63d3721aa2f802573f4005
54af9/$FILE/Statement%20of%20Strategy%202008–2010.pdf. accessed December 8, 2011. 
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the economic crisis in Ireland will have for sure also a certainly impact its security 
apparatus, especially in the field of personnel and the procurement of new systems. 
 
 Sweden 
In contrast to Ireland, the end of the Cold War had a significant impact on 
Sweden’s foreign and security policy. The direct threat to Sweden from the east was 
reduced. The Baltic States became independent from the Soviet Union; Poland faced 
west, and the former East Germany was integrated into West Germany. Based on this 
remarkable change in the Swedish security environment, Sweden initiated a fundamental 
reform of its security strategy and armed forces, which greatly affected its neutrality 
policy. 
Until 1989, Sweden viewed participation in the European Community as 
incompatible with its neutrality. But after the Cold War in 1991, Sweden submitted a 
request for EU membership, in the wake of a new and less restrictive interpretation of its 
neutrality policy. The Swedish parliament redefined neutrality as the absence of alliances 
during peacetime, but also admitted the possibility of military alliances during war. 
Sweden’s accession to the EU in 1995 was not only economically motivated; Sweden had 
a strong intention to actively shape the new security architecture in Europe. 
The reform process between 1990 and 1995 had a strong impact on Sweden’s 
national politics. The armed forces, however, remained nearly unchanged during this 
period. Sweden’s military was 750,000 soldiers strong. Its strategy was geared to 
territorial defense. The initial step in the transformation of Sweden’s armed forces started 
in 1995 with its participation in PfP and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.50 
 The Swedish parliament adopted a bill renewing Sweden’s defense in 1996.51 
The resolution stated that Sweden’s security environment had radically changed after the 
Cold War. Because of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc the risk for a direct military attack 
became unlikely. Instead new threats like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
                                                
50 The treaty led to the creation of the euro, and created what was commonly referred to as the pillar 
structure of the European Union, including the main pillars of the future CSDP. 
51 The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden. The Renewal of Sweden’s Defence: 
Phase 2, 1996. Stockholm. http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/56/49/e043d837.pdf. accessed 
December 8, 2011. 
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terrorism and environmental and civil catastrophes were added.52 Hence the new strategy 
shifted from a single defense approach to international peace building and domestic 
disaster relief. Its standing military was reduced to 300,000, and the structure was 
consequently adapted to the flexible and modular needs of multipurpose forces. The 
report A Changing World—A Reformed Defense53 of 1998 underlined the development of 
the Swedish security policy toward the strong international cooperation of the EU 
member states in peace building and made a convincing commitment to the Petersberg 
Tasks. 
In 1999, Sweden’s defense commission stated that based on a ten-year forecast, a 
direct military invasion is unlikely. This assessment initiated a further reduction of the 
defense capabilities and fostered the commitment vis-à-vis the CSDP and NATO’s PfP. 
Sweden augmented its military personnel for EU’s rapid reaction forces up to 1,500 and 
1,100 for the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG). 54 
In the aftermath of 9/11 Sweden’s defense commission underlined the importance 
of the war against terrorism and initiated a bill called Our Future Defense.55 Sweden 
further reduced its defense capabilities on behalf of the international engagement. The 
international concept provides military forces for two missions in the strength of one 
battalion each, in addition to three smaller units for limited missions. 
Along with Sweden’s development of its international capabilities came the 
enlargement of its professional armed forces and the peacetime abolishment of 
 
 
                                                
52 The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden. The Renewal of Sweden’s Defence: 
Phase 2, 1996. Stockholm. http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/56/49/e043d837.pdf, accessed 
December 8, 2011. 
53 The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden. A Changing World – A Reformed 
Defence. Stockholm. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/02/56/44/5f48200a.pdf., accessed December 8, 
2011. 
54  The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden.  European Security – Sweden’s Defence 
Stockholm. 1999. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/02/56/72/79721b3b.pdf., accessed December 8, 
2011. 
55 The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden. Our Future Defence – The focus of 
Swedish defence Policy 2005–2007. Stockholm, 2004. 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/21/19/224a4b3c.pdf., accessed December 8, 2011. 
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conscription,. Sweden’s close cooperation with NATO has a large stake in the Nordic 
Defense Cooperation and approves its joint capabilities for international operations, 
especially with its navy and air force. 
 
 Switzerland 
After the Cold War, Switzerland found itself for the first time far away from a 
direct external threat. Because of the significant changes of the security environment the 
Swiss citizens, politicians, and economy demanded reform of the Swiss security policy 
and hence a renunciation of the independent territorial defense strategy based on the 1973 
concept. Switzerland reacted to the so-called Report 90 on the Swiss Security Policy on 
the changed security environment in Europe by proposing a popular initiative for the 
abolishment of the Swiss Armed Forces, which has not been successful. Report 90 can be 
seen as a transitional strategy from territorial defense to the new security challenges of 
the early nineties.56 
In contrast to the report of 1973, the Report 90 analyzes not only the threats but 
also the possibilities for cooperative efforts facing a secure Europe. In addition the report 
contains threats, which are not motivated by power policy, such as environmental or 
civilization-conditioned threats. The report resulted in three newly defined tasks for the 
armed forces: international peace building, prevention of war, and thirdly territorial 
defense. The strategy adhered to the concept of armed neutrality. Report 90 led to the 95 
Guidance for the Armed Forces. The major aspects of reform were the reduction of the 
armed forces from 600,000 down to 400,000 and the implementation of a more flexible 
and modular brigade structure.57 The aspect of stronger international cooperation was 
retarded because of the refusal of a Swiss blue helmets contingent in 1994 by a national 
referendum. However, Switzerland adhered to the internationalization of the security 
policy and accessed the PfP in 1996. 
                                                
56 Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel: Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung 
über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz vom 1. Oktober 1990. 1990. 847–904. 
http://www.parlament.ch/d/dokumentation/dossiers/sipol/Documents/sipol-90–061-bericht-d.pdf, accessed 
December 8, 2011. 
57 Bericht des Bundsrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee in den 
neunziger Jahren (Armeeleitbild 95). Bern. Bundesamt für Bauten und Logistik, 1992. 850–1015. 
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In 1999, the Swiss Department for Defense presented Report 2000, which stated a 
stronger intention toward cooperation but simultaneously emphasized the importance of 
military neutrality and sovereignty.58 Switzerland started its deployment in the Balkans 
and acceded to the UN in 2002. Report XXI on the armed forces provided a solid concept 
for the future of the Swiss national security strategy, but due to a huge national debate led 
by the far right party, the strategy faced difficulty during implementation.59 Hence, Swiss 
security strategy remained torn between more outgoing international cooperation and 
staying the same—and static. 
The latest report on the Swiss security policy, published in 2010, is a compromise 
among the different political claims on the Swiss armed forces. The core of the 2010 
report focuses more on the domestic cooperation between the different security 
institutions but also adheres to a strong international cooperation. The approach of an 
autonomous defense strategy remains based on a consequent policy of neutrality.60 
But because of financial challenges, a reduction of the armed forces to 100,000 
and correlated adaptions of the organization and structure will be the consequences of the 
latest development. Based on Report 2010 of the armed forces, international cooperation 
will be reinforced with up to 1,000 soldiers.61 
To sum up, the transformation of Europe’s armed forces includes three main 
fields. First, doctrinal reforms, which result from the changed threats and the associated 
new missions for military forces in an international environment away from territorial 
defense facing the challenges of multispectral crisis management. Second, there was a 
strong structural transformation from conscripts to professional forces, from fixed 
structures to modular units and toward multipurpose capabilities. Third, developments in 
                                                
58 Sicherheit durch Kooperation: Bericht des Bundesrates and die Bundesversammlung über die 
Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz (SIPOL B 2000). Bern. Bundesamt für Bauten und Logistik, 1999, S. 7658–
7736. 
59 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee XXI 
(Armeeleitbild XXI). Bern. Bundesamt für Bauten und Logistik, 2002. 966–1051.  
60 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz vom 
23. Juni 2010. Bundesamt für bauten und Logistik, 2010. 5133–5221.  
61 Ibid. 5133–5221.  
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the field of the operations are key essential aspects. Jointness and interoperability among 
the different armed forces are required competencies. 
D. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES AND ARMED FORCES 
This section provides a brief comparative analysis of selected aspects of the 
different neutral states and their armed forces. This section is intentionally issues-
structured and not organized by state. The three chosen factors are the threat assessment, 
the legal framework, and the mission spectrum of the armed forces. Those three factors 
are chosen because they are highly influenced by the states neutral security and defense 
policies. The study resists focusing on financial and human resources and the different 
models of services, professional versus conscript, as well as the different methods of 
training. National finances and not the concept of neutrality mainly influence those 
aspects. However, this caveat should not suggest these other aspects are less important; 
rather, it would exceed the topic of this study to analyze them. 
 
 Threat and Risk Assessment 
The threat and risk assessment of the neutral states studied here show certain 
similarities. All states agree that the conventional threat of a war in Europe is unlikely. 
However, none of the neutral states completely rule out the risk of a direct or indirect 
military attack. Consequently, they seek to retain a core competency in territorial defense.  
Based on a stable and secure security environment in Europe, the states here recognize 
the danger of conflicts and war at the periphery of Europe, especially in the east and 
south. While, in the case of emerging conflicts, the fighting may occur far from the 
neutrals’ borders, they fear attendant risks, for example refugee flows.62 Due to 
globalization, all five states anticipate an increase of transnational threats, like terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime.  From the point of 
view of domestic threats, they agree on a certain risk of environmental disasters and 
ecological catastrophes. 
                                                
62 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz vom 
23. Juni 2010. Bundesamt für Bauten und Logistik, 2010. 5133–5221. 
 40 
Besides the parallels in the threat and risk assessment, there are some major 
divergences among strategies. In contrast to the EU-member states, Switzerland assesses 
security in Europe more skeptically but appreciates the positive effect of NATO and 
EU/CSDP on the security and stability in Europe. Based on geopolitical location, Sweden 
and Finland have a different perspective on Russia, while Austria is more concerned with 
the Balkan region. Switzerland sees a certain risk in the flow of refugees because of its 
relative proximity to the Adriatic and Mediterranean Sea, as well as the potential 
spillover from refugees from the Maghreb States.63 
Additional differences exist relating to the security institutions of the EU and 
NATO. For the EU-member states, the CSDP is highly important and directly affects the 
states’ national security policy and strategy. NATO plays a more important role in the 
Nordic states like Sweden and Finland than it does for Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland, 
mainly because of the very close cooperation with Norway as a NATO member in the 
NBG.   
 
 Legal Framework 
The political and conceptual alignment of the armed forces differs significantly in 
the investigated states. There are major distinctions on how the constitution and the 
different legal frameworks are shaped. Based on the legal framework and the political 
term, office reforms and transformations proceed faster or slower. The main differences 
are found in political and public opinions. While in Finland, Ireland and Sweden the 
constitutional concerns are limited, in the case of Austria and Switzerland, the citizens 
have the final say in national referendums.64 
In all five states at issue here, the framework for the armed forces is provided in 
the relevant law. In the case of Austria and Switzerland, most aspects of defense are 
 
 
                                                
63 Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz vom 
23, Juni 2010. 5133–5221. 
64 Armeebericht 2010. 2010. 
http://www.vbs.admin.ch/Internet/vbs/de/home/documentation/bases/verteidigung.parsys.62529.download
List.72287.DownloadFile.tmp/armeeberichtd.pdf, accessed December 8, 2011. 
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established in the constitution. Hence, profound reforms demand an adaptation of the 
constitution, which entails a longer political process than, for example, in Sweden, where 
only the military law has to be adapted. 
 
 Mission Spectrum of the Armed Forces 
The missions of the armed forces are essentially identical among all the neutrals. 
All the states have three main missions for their military forces: defense, providing 
assistance to the civil authorities in crisis management, and international disaster relief 
and peace building.65 
In the case of defense, the main difference is the question about where territorial 
defense starts. For example, based on its neutrality policy, Switzerland considers 
territorial defense to begin with the state’s territory, while the other neutral states take the 
view that territorial defense starts beyond national borders. This different point of view 
has an enormous impact on the national security strategy and armed forces doctrine. 66 
E. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS 
The neutral states in this comparison comprise the classical neutral states in 
Western and Central Europe during the Cold War. Despite their differences, particularly 
Austria, Finland and Sweden have been important benchmarks for the development of the 
Swiss security policy and military strategy during the East-West conflict. This fact  
changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Switzerland remained the only neutral state that 
is not part of the EU and, hence, is the only real alliance-free armed neutral state in 
Europe. Since all of the five states are not members of NATO, (although they play not 
inconsiderable qualitative roles within PfP)  they continue to be an important point of 
reference for the security policy of Switzerland and are comparable states. 
                                                
65 Armeebericht 2010. 
http://www.vbs.admin.ch/Internet/vbs/de/home/documentation/bases/verteidigung.parsys.62529.download
List.72287.DownloadFile.tmp/armeeberichtd.pdf, accessed December 08, 2011. 
66 The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden. A Functional Defence, 2010. 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/13/77/05/1705333d.pdf, accessed December 8, 2011. 
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The concepts of the national transformation processes vary depending on the 
states’ policies. In all the investigated cases, the three-stage approach of the reforms and 
transformation can be identified: a reduction of the personnel and infrastructure; an 
adaptation of the strategy to the changed security environment and a correlated adaptation 
of the structure and organization of the armed forces toward a more flexible, modular 
multifunctional military force; and an accentuation of the trend toward smaller, 
increasingly specialized forces, often prompted by financial cost cuts. The enormous 
increase of cost in the procurement and maintenance of new high-tech systems tightened 
the ongoing development. Based on this study, it can be summarized that none of the 
reforms and transformation processes in the investigated neutral states are concluded or 
even heading toward its final phase. The entire phenomenon seems to be an iterative 
process that can be identified as permanent change. 
As far as neutrality is concerned, all of the investigated states intend to hold on to 
their patterns of neutrality, which confirms that the concept of neutrality allows many 
different interpretations, including variants that accommodate the political framework of 
the CSDP. But it must be underlined that Switzerland remains the only alliance-free 
neutral state in Europe that maintains armed forces. Hence, the author’s thesis that 
neutrality is  obsolescent, except for Switzerland, is confirmed.  
 
 Austria 
Currently, Austria is conceptualizing its new security and defense doctrine for the 
middle of 2011 to replace its 2001 strategy, a process driven forward by budget 
stringency as well as an intense civil-military debate over the retention of conscription. 
The new strategy will focus much more on domestic disaster relief and international 
peace building to the disadvantage of the territorial defense capabilities on the heavy, 
mechanized model of earlier times. The paradigm shift away from defense supports 
resource allocation in the area of international missions. Following the prevailing 
political opinion, NATO accession is not an issue anymore and will not be mentioned in 
Austria’s new strategy document. Furthermore, Austria has so far retained conscription, 
despite domestic crisis about same,  thereby resisting the trend toward professionalization 
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of the armed forces that even long-time holdouts like Germany and Sweden have latterly 
embraced. In addition, Austria is working on a comprehensive crisis management 
strategy, including national and international institutions and defining the role and 
participation of Austria’s armed forces. 
 
 Finland 
Finland is implementing the new Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2009. This 
policy is based on the identically named strategy concept of 2004. The strategy intends to 
follow a double-track approach, national and territorial defense and multilateral 
cooperation with a main focus on peace building. Its armed forces will be reduced to 
250,000, which, in comparison to the other states mentioned, is a relatively modest 
reduction, at least from the most recent numbers. 




Ireland presents itself as an exception. The strategy of the armed forces mainly 
focuses on advanced police tasks, like riot control and combating domestic terror. Also in 
Ireland, there is a trend away from internal deployments toward a strong engagement in 
international crisis management. In comparison to other states, Ireland’s percentage 
reduction of military personnel during the last ten years is not as significant as it is in 
other states, for example, Austria or Switzerland. 
The new white book for Ireland’s future security strategy covers the timeframe 
2011–2020 and can be expected by the end 2011.67 There will be no major strategic 
changes. Because of Ireland’s challenging financial situation, there is a certain tendency 
to further reforms and cutbacks, especially with the procurement of modern armaments 
and systems and wage bills for professional soldiers. 
 
 
                                                
67 The official version had not yet been published by the beginning of December 2011. 
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 Sweden 
The most advanced state examined in entire process of reforms and armed forces 
transformation is Sweden. It abolished the general conscription system during peacetime. 
Sweden interprets the EU mutual aid clause of the Lisbon Treaty as a defense alliance in 
the case of a direct military threat. Based on this assessment, Sweden focuses its armed 
forces on peace-building operations. A comparable but less advanced trend toward, 
international peace building can be observed in Austria and Finland.  
Since 2009, Sweden has implemented a profound reform of its security strategy in 
general and its armed forces in particular. The main pillars of Sweden’s transformation 
are strong development toward a 50,000-strong professional army, using a highly 
modular structure of the armed forces following the needs of interoperability, strategic 
mobility, and joint operations. NATO accession is not intended in the medium-term. 
 
 Switzerland 
In the case of Switzerland, the trend shows a different pathway. The shift in the 
Swiss security policy focuses more on the support of domestic civil authorities. A change 
of emphasis toward international peace building is, in comparison to the other neutral 
states in Europe, still relatively weak, although national defense remains a strong 
component. 
Switzerland reduced its armed forces by more than a third, like Sweden and 
Austria; to the military numbered about 55,000 in the beginning of 2011. 
In 2010, Switzerland adopted Report on the Armed Forces 2010, a detailed 
analysis of the Swiss Armed Forces with proposals for improvement. Based on this 
report, the federal assembly is expected to call for reform in the field of the military law. 
These adaptations will mainly focus on a stronger international alignment—and surely 
will provoke another political debate about the pros and cons of Swiss military 
involvement in international missions. The introduction of the new military bill is 
planned for 2013 and will be implemented between 2015 and 2020.  
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Accession to NATO is not a topic at all; however a moderate rapprochement 
toward CSDP is part of the discussion. Upcoming procurements, for example the 
purchase of a new type of fighter aircraft, indicates that Switzerland will keep a strong 
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IV. SWITZERLAND’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
EUROPEAN UNION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section provides a brief overview of Switzerland’s international security 
structures as a means to understand the formulation of policy and its character in the 
midst of change in the present. The main part of the chapter investigates in detail the 
relationship between Switzerland and the EU. The broader context of Switzerland in the 
realm of the international organizations and institutions becomes clearer in the 
explication of its relationship to the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 
1. United Nations 
Switzerland joined the UN in 2002. It had, however, already participated in UN 
operations for a long time. Swiss Military Observers are currently deployed in a number 
of UN missions. In April 2007, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
officially recognized that the United Nations Military Observers Course delivered by the 
Swiss Armed Forces International Command Training Centre utilizes the United Nations 
Standardized Peacekeeping Training materials and thus meets the United Nations 
peacekeeping training standards.  The DDPS “Spiez Laboratory” is a recognized UN 
facility, particularly for chemical analyses. Furthermore, mine action is one of the 
political priorities of Switzerland within the UN system, supporting the UN Mine Action 
Service through the Mine Action Support Group. The Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has extended its cooperation with the UN, 
international standards for mine action, studies and expert reports. 
 Switzerland is also acting on the diplomatic level. The Small-Five Initiative, the 
Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, the International Process on 
Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, and the Chairmanship of the Peace Building 
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Commission’s Burundi Configuration, which took place from July 2009 to July 2010, all 
underscore Switzerland’s determination to address current security issues. 
2. Council of Europe  
Switzerland became a member of the CE in May 1963 and to date has ratified 109 
and signed but not ratified another 15 out of the total of over 200 of its conventions. The 
conventions, which are not ratified by Switzerland, are mainly in the realm of the 
conventions about nationality and defense policy, which would have a strong impact on 
the Swiss understanding of autonomy. It plays an active role in this international 
organization (e.g. Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress 
of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe) whose main objectives consist of defending 
human rights, upholding the rule of law and democracy, promoting common European 
cultural identity, and searching for solutions to major social problems. From November 
2009 until May 2010, Switzerland held the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers. 
One major concern while holding the chairmanship was the reform of the European Court 
of Human Rights, of which Switzerland is also a signatory state. The ratification of the 
Protocol No. 14, to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms by Russia and the Interlaken Declaration were the most significant outcomes of 
Swiss efforts. 
3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 Switzerland has been participating in the CSCE/OSCE since the organization’s 
inception in the pivotal events of détente in Europe in the year 1973. OSCE offered the 
country a platform to promote common values and principles and an equal footing on 
which to negotiate in a cooperative manner, an effort that bore results in the year 1989 
and thereafter. Inter alia, Switzerland has organized many expert meetings, held the 
chairmanship in 1996, and provided the former Director of the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights as well as supplying a logistical support unit to the OSCE 
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996 to 2000. 
 In the framework of the OSCE, Switzerland puts a major emphasis on 
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strengthening confidence- and security-building measures as well as fostering democratic 
control of armed forces and international humanitarian law. Compliance with the 
commitments along with full and correct implementation of the agreed measures are 
perceived as essential principles in order to strengthen confidence, security and stability 
in the OSCE area. Switzerland stands for a respectful and constructive debate on a new 
European security structure and attaches value to strengthening the OSCE. 
4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 The essential channels for consultation and cooperation between Switzerland and 
NATO are the PfP Program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).  Along 
with the other classical neutrals who have adjusted to the post 1989 European order,  
Switzerland also contributes to NATO-led peace-support operations, i.e. to KFOR. 
Switzerland views PfP as an important element of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture 
and shares its basic concept—stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area through 
cooperation, transparency, and democratic control. It is also a useful instrument to 
support the development of the armed forces. The basic principles of PfP—voluntariness 
and self-differentiation—are consistent with Switzerland’s policy and obligations of 
neutrality.  Enlargement of NATO in central and eastern Europe that took a major step 
forward in 1994 with PfP and the enlargement study of 1995 has contributed indirectly to 
the security of Switzerland, with the reduction of conflict in areas that had been prone to 
same in the past, the German-Polish relationship, or the German-Czech relationship.   
 Switzerland joined PfP in 1996. From the beginning, the main focus has been on 
enhancing the interoperability for Article-5 crisis-response operations. Since 1998, 
Switzerland has taken part in the PARP and in NATO/PfP multinational staff and field 
exercises as another instrument to enhance interoperability. In addition, Switzerland 
contributes to a number of other PfP activities, including the support of defense and 
security sector reform processes and disarmament projects. Education and training 
courses are also part of Swiss contribution of considerable qualitative value along with 
those of other classical neutrals considered here, i.e. the Austrians, Finns and Swedes in 
particular. 
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B. EUROPEAN UNION 
1. Introduction 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, but it contributes on a case-by-case basis to 
EU-led military and civilian operations and collaborates closely with classical neutrals 
who have joined the EU, as in the case of Austria. Militarily, Switzerland currently 
contributes to the EU-led operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Role 
of the EU as an international security actor is becoming more and more important. 
Therefore, the bilateral framework agreement regulating Swiss contribution to EU-led 
military and civil operations was adopted in 2004. This following section provide a 
detailed analysis of the relation between Switzerland and the EU and the impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the associated consequences for Switzerland’s foreign, security and 
defense policy. 
 Switzerland is planning to conclude an administrative arrangement with the 
European Defense Agency (EDA)68 in order to gain access to Europe’s most important 
multilateral procurement cooperation network in the fields of research, development, 
procurement and maintenance of military systems. The Federal Council has approved the 
negotiating mandate and concrete negotiations are underway. 
The overarching issue in the relationship between the EU and Switzerland is 
whether Switzerland has the political will and capabilities to adapt the existing bilateral 
structures that connect it to the EU to the new institutional and political factors in 
Brussels.  
2. The Treaty Framework 
This section outlines the EU’s efforts to reform its treaty framework during the 
last ten years and explains the most important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. In 
                                                
68 The European Defense Agency (EDA) is an agency of the European Union based in Brussels. It is a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) body set up on 12 July 2004, reporting to the Council of the 
European Union. All EU member states, except Denmark, which has an opt-out of the CFSP, take part in 
the agency. Norway, which is not a EU member, has been granted an opt-in to participate in the EDA 
programs without voting rights. 
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addition, it discusses the roots and particularities of the bilateralism between the EU and 
Switzerland and its potential future development. 
a. The EU Reforms and the Development of the Treaty 
In December 2001, EU decision-makers initiated an additional reform of 
existing EU treaties, triggered by unsuccessful negotiations in Nice. Because of the 
upcoming enlargement toward the east, the EU had to adapt the voting rights in the 
Council of Ministers, and it was necessary to bring into line the number of members of 
the European Parliament. Along with these optimizations came the improvement of the 
democratic process within the Union, as well as the enhancement of organizational and 
institutional efficiency. This reform process resulted in the 2004 European Constitutional 
Treaty. But the ratification of this treaty failed in 2005 after France and the Netherlands 
voted against it. In 2007, the EU’s policy-makers agreed on a framework for a reform 
treaty. The new treaty kept the main substance of the Constitutional Treaty but lost the 
explicitly constitutional character of its forerunner. (The EU does not count as a real 
federal government because it remains a union of more or less sovereign states, rather 
than a single, unified state.) Two years later, in December 2009, the accord known today 
as the Lisbon Treaty entered into force.69 
The 2009 treaty consolidated the basic concept of the European Political 
Union, founded in 1992 at Maastricht. The legal form of the Union is based on 
multilateral cooperation and ruled by legislative procedure between the member states. 
The Council of the EU, also known as the Council of Ministers, and the European 






                                                
69 EU, “The Lisbon Treaty,” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/treaty-of-lisbon?lang=en, accessed 
December 8, 2011. 
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of policy, notably foreign affairs. The European Council became the formal institution 
defining the EU’s general political direction, led by an elected president who served for 
two and a half years.70 
The Union’s Council for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has a 
permanent president who serves as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and as Vice President of the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty 
enhances the CSDP as part of the CFSP and assigns also duties to the national 
parliaments. The European citizens’ initiative and the option of a withdrawal clause are 
two additional innovations of the latest European Union Treaty.71 This fact is significant 
to the Swiss-EU relationship because it shows a stronger involvement of the citizens and 
hence a higher development of the democratic principals within the EU, which leads to a 
higher level of integration of the EU member states with only minimum loss of national 
autonomy.  
The relationship between Switzerland and the EU is characterized by 
bilateralism. The bilateral approach historically emerged from the Swiss understanding of 
autonomy, self-determination, and neutrality based on its historical role in the European 
system in modern history. Bilateralism can be seen as a contractual relationship between 
the two entities and is dominated by the Swiss national interest of sovereignty. The whole 
bilateral approach is mainly driven by economic factors. Switzerland approaches the EU 
on a volunteer basis, mostly to gain some economic advantage by adapting parts of 
European law and regulations to meet the requirements of multilateral interoperability. 
The Switzerland-European Community Free Trade Agreement of 1972 
was a first step in the bilateral agreements. It dismantled such trade barriers as customs 
and quotas for industrial products between the contracting parties, thereby creating a free-
                                                
70 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union 9, 17: “Vertrag von Lissabon zur Änderung des Vertrags über 
die Europäische Union und des Vertrags zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft,” December 2007. 
“Konsolidierte Fassungen des Vertrags über die Europäische Union und des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise 
der Europäischen Union,” December 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:DE:HTML. C 115/01–388.  http://eurlex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:DE:HTML, accessed December 8, 2011. 
71 Ibid. 
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trade zone.72 A similar flirtation with greater harmonization came in the form of the 
Insurance Agreement of 1989, which guaranteed insurance companies of both 
Switzerland and European Community members the freedom to establish operations in 
each other’s territory.73 The agreement covered—and covers—a discrete economic 
subsector on a strictly bilateral basis.  From the Swiss perspective, the agreement makes 
sense, as this increased interoperability of the insurance system provides a practical and 
limited synchronization for economic reasons; because it is based on a bilateral approach, 
the preservation and development of the sovereignty of the Swiss law is granted.  In 
many ways, this agreement forms the preferred model by which the Swiss wish to 
interact with Europe. 
Indeed, while the other European Free Trade Association (EFTA)74 states 
clamored for the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992, the Swiss electorate rejected 
full multilateral integration in the inner-European market. In other words, the 
constitutionally mandated plebiscite committed Swiss policymakers not to adopt EU law 
in the comprehensive package of the EEA but rather to continue negotiating with Europe 
on a piece-by-piece basis in order to keep some freedom of action—and national 
sovereignty.  
Thus, after the 1992 vote, the bilateral approach emerged as an alternative 
to more problematic engagement with the whole EU as a system. The main legal 
framework was written down in the 1999 and 2004 treaties, the so-called Bilateral 
Agreements I and II.75 These agreements provide the legal regulations for a sectoral 
                                                
72 Federal Departments of Foreign Affairs, “Bilateral Agreements Switzerland−EU.” Bern, August 
2009. 
73 Federal Departments of Foreign Affairs, “Bilateral Agreements Switzerland−EU.” 
74 The European Free Trade Association or EFTA is a free trade organization between four European 
countries that operates parallel to, and is linked to, the EU. EFTA was established on 3 May 1960 as a trade 
bloc-alternative for European states who were either unable to, or chose not to, join the then-European 
Economic Community (EEC) which has now become the EU. The Stockholm Convention, establishing 
EFTA, was signed on 4 January 1960 in Stockholm by seven countries. Today's EFTA members are 
Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland—the latter two being founding members. The initial 
Stockholm Convention was superseded by the Vaduz Convention, which provides for the liberalization of 
trade among the member states. 
75 EDA/EVD, “Die Europapolitik der Schweiz.” 
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political and economic integration without obligations to adopt EU law.76 As with the 
earlier insurance treaty, the Bilateral Agreements allow Swiss–EU cooperation where 
practical considerations prevail—and where Switzerland does not feel its sovereignty to 
be imperiled. As a complement to the 1972 Free Trade Agreement, the Bilateral 
Agreement I involves a further reciprocal opening of markets in six specific areas: free 
movement of persons; lower technical trade barriers; public procurement; agriculture; and 
air and land transport. In addition, the research agreement enables Switzerland to 
participate in EU research programs.77  Bilateral Agreement II covers additional 
economic interests and extends cooperation to internal security, asylum, the environment, 
and culture. They concern Swiss participation in the Schengen/Dublin Agreement and 
agreements on taxation of savings, processed agricultural products, cooperation in 
statistics, fighting fraud, retirement pensions of EU officials, and Swiss participation in 
the EU media programs, the environmental agency and EU education, professional 
training, and youth programs.78  
In contrast to Bilateral Agreement I, Agreement II entails much stronger 
obligations to the EU and implies a much greater degree of policy harmonization. Both 
agreements effected more coordination between Switzerland and the EU, but each point 
was negotiated separately and, as a series of bilateral understandings, underscored 
Switzerland’s unique status vis-à-vis the Union. Further, the ecologically oriented parts 
of the bilateral accords are, with the exceptions of the tariff and civil air transport 
agreements, based on international law. Of course, international law takes the sovereign 
state as its basic unit, for the most part.  As such, equality of rights is the core principle of 
the Bilateral Agreements; indeed, all the treaties between Switzerland and the EU follow 
the principle that both parties have to adapt their laws, following the ongoing 
development of the relationship.79  
                                                
76 Federal Departments of Foreign Affairs, “Bilateral Agreements Switzerland−EU.”  
77 Federal Departments of Foreign Affairs, “Bilateral Agreements Switzerland−EU.” 
78 Ibid. 
79 Sandra Lavenex,  “Switzerland’s Flexible Integration in the EU: A Conceptual Framework,” Swiss 
Political Science Review 15 (2009): 551. 
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In certain fields of security, like the international fight against crime and 
terrorism, Switzerland binds itself by the Schengen and Dublin agreements of association 
to accept the EU law. The Schengen/Dublin Agreement affects Swiss security and shows 
that cooperation is, to a certain extent, inevitable because the issues and threats do not 
stop at the EU–Swiss border any more than internal borders within the EU seriously 
impede security concerns. From the Swiss perspective, Switzerland has changed its 
domestic law to harmonize it with discrete and delimited aspects of EU law to the extent 
that national sovereignty can bear such changes. But from the EU’s viewpoint, 
Switzerland seems sometimes to acknowledge EU law as binding, while rejecting it at 
other times, which leads to a certain inconsistency, with ramifications for policy, 
planning, and practice. 
To establish an overarching framework for the several bilateral 
agreements and to improve the coordination of the different working groups, Switzerland 
undertook to establish a skeleton agreement with the EU. In December 2008, EU member 
states agreed to such a project but linked it to a demand that Switzerland take on the 
agreements of association for all bilateral agreements. Such a step would be tantamount 
to a complete adoption of EU law by Switzerland and would lead to the abandonment of 
the bilateral approach, based on international law and Switzerland’s distinct national 
sovereignty.80 
The advantage of a skeleton agreement, based on EU law, would be the 
opportunity to define explicitly in which political fields Switzerland wants or does not 
want to participate. But the negotiations are overshadowed by the EU’s additional 
demand that Switzerland cooperate in all political fields. Hence, the political ideas of the 
EU do not match the bilateral approach preferred by Switzerland. The future 
development and feasibility of the bilateralism must be discussed in the context of these 
facts and circumstances. This context raises essential questions about the potential for a 
                                                
80 Council of the European Union, “Draft Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss 
Confederation Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Swiss Confederation in the EU Crisis 
Management Operations,” 2004, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/ st12/st12426.en04pdf, 
accessed December 8, 2011. 
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future development of the bilateral approach without a skeleton agreement and about the 
meaning of a partial integration if Switzerland would be obliged to adopt the EU law.81 
The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the future development of Swiss–EU 
bilateralism is indirect but decisive. Because of the institutional changes in the EU, 
Switzerland now finds it much more challenging to cultivate the appropriate direct 
contacts with Brussels decision makers in order to influence the EU’s policy and law 
making. Furthermore, the EU’s strengthened self-perception, based on the Lisbon Treaty, 
as an important global player, and the nonparticipation of Switzerland in the Treaty 
categorizes Switzerland as a “free rider,” not willing to share the burden of Europe as a 
whole. This implication casts a poor light on Switzerland.82 
The institutional development in the field of EU foreign and security 
policy and the modified legal procedures based on the Lisbon Treaty with a special focus 
on the ratification process is an additional aspect which must be explained to clarify the 
importance of this thesis. The double office of the European Union’s High Representative 
for Foreign and Security Policy and the Vice President of the European Commission is 
one of the major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. It unifies the responsibility for foreign 
affairs and the oversight of the CFSP. Indeed, the new High Representative, Catherine 
Ashton, is in charge of all aspects of the EU’s foreign policy. In addition, she is the head 
of the Council for Foreign Affairs, which is the board for the twenty-seven foreign and 
defense ministers of the member states. The CFSP, including the CSDP, is the main 
institution through which EU member states coordinate actions in such fields as human 
rights, disarmament, and conflict prevention. Different instruments to support economical 
and social transformation processes mainly characterize the common foreign policy. The 
main task of the High Representative is to coordinate the different tools.83 
How Ashton will interpret her function is not conclusive yet. She is 
confronted with a broad spectrum of responsibilities. After one year in charge, she seems 
                                                
81 Council of the European Union, “Draft Agreement.” 
82 Micheline Calmy-Rey, “Ansprache anlässlich des Europatages 2010.” Bern, May 2010. 
83 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union, “Vertrag von Lissabon zur Änderung.” 
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mainly absorbed with international security affairs issues and the EU’s relationship to the 
global players. Maintaining the contractual foreign affairs agreements on a supranational 
level is not her priority, although it would be desirable from the Swiss point of view if 
she would improve her efforts in this area, in her function as Vice President of the 
European Commission. The important aspect is that she has to be the dominating voice of 
European Union’s policy, ensuring a coherent EU foreign policy. 
The newly established European External Action Service (EEAS)84 is the 
main support instrument for Ashton’s office.85 This organization is responsible for the 
general secretariat of the EU Council and is staffed with diplomats from the member 
states. The contributors to the EEAS coordinate and lead the working groups of the 
Council and represent the EU in various international organizations and for foreign 
affairs. Hence, the EEAS is an important interface to non-European Union countries. 
The European Council, composed of the Heads of State or Government of 
the EU member states, is another important institution. Like the Foreign Affairs Council, 
there is a permanent chairmanship, the President of the European Council. Its function is 
to represent the EU vis-à-vis the ministers of third states; the Council President, together 
with the European Commission President, also represents the EU in the field of the 
foreign economic affairs.86 With the enlargement of the legislative procedure, the 
European Parliament gained the decisive ability to shape international agreements in a 
broad political field. In the area of trade policy, the Parliament is equal to the Council.87 
                                                
84 The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the EU department that was established following 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. It was formally launched on 1 December 
2010 and serves as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU, implementing the EU's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and other areas of the EU's external representation. The EEAS is under the 
authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), a post also created by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, whom it assists. 
85 Council of the European Union, “Draft Council Decision of 25 March 2010 Establishing the 
Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service,” 2010. 
86 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union, “Vertrag von Lissabon zur Änderung.” 
87 Stephen Woolcock, “The Potential Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union External Trade 
Policy,” SIEPS European Policy Analysis 2008, no. 8, http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/ european-
policy-analysis/the-potential-impact-of-the-lisbon-treaty-on-european-union-external-trade-policy.html, 
accessed December 8, 2011. 
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The upshot of these organizational changes is a concentration of power in 
Brussels, which has some major consequences for Switzerland.  The overarching issue in 
the relationship between the EU and Switzerland is whether Switzerland has the political 
will and capabilities to adapt the existing bilateral structures that connect it to the EU to 
the new institutional and political factors in Brussels. Hence, a special focus of this study 
is the institutional reforms and the new common platforms for political exchange.  
Moreover, the study critically scrutinizes Switzerland’s almost exclusively economic 
motivations for cooperation with the EU. A closer analysis of the Lisbon Treaty indicates 
that there may be new opportunities for Switzerland to reconsider cooperation in security 
and defense policy with the EU. The enlarged field of the EU’s CSDP and the strong 
commitment of the Union to improve its efforts in peace building and crisis management 
provide prospects for Switzerland.  
In December 2001, EU decision-makers initiated an additional reform of 
the existing EU treaties, triggered by unsuccessful negotiations in Nice. Because of the 
upcoming enlargement to the east, the EU had to adapt the voting rights in the Council of 
Ministers, and it was necessary to bring into line the number of members of the European 
Parliament. Along with these optimizations came the improvement of democracy and the 
Union’s efficiency. This reform process resulted in the 2004 European Constitutional 
Treaty. But the ratification of this treaty failed in 2005 after France and the Netherlands 
voted against it. In 2007, the EU’s policy-makers agreed on a framework for a reform 
treaty. The new treaty kept the main content but in a less constitutional character. The EU 
does not have a real federal government because it is still a union and not a united state. 
Two years later, in December 2009, the accord today known as Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force.88 
The 2009 treaty consolidated the basic concept of the European Political 
Union, founded in 1992 in Maastricht. The legal form of the Union is based on 
multilateral cooperation and ruled by legislative procedure between the member states. 
The Council of the EU, also know as the Council of Ministers and the European 
                                                
88 EU, “The Lisbon Treaty.”  
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Parliament have equal rights concerning the law-making process, except for certain fields 
of policy, such as foreign affairs. The European Council became the formal institution 
defining the EU’s general political direction, led by a president, elected for two and a half 
years.89 
The Union’s Council for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has also a 
permanent President who serves as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and as Vice President of the European commission. The Lisbon Treaty 
enhances the CSDP as part of the CFSP and assigns also duties to the national 
parliaments. The European citizens’ initiative and the option of a withdrawal clause are 
two additional innovations of the latest EU Treaty.90 
b. Bilateralism 
The relationship between Switzerland and the EU is characterized by 
“bilateralism.” The bilateral approach historically emerged from the Swiss understanding 
of autonomy, self-determination and neutrality. Bilateralism can be seen as a contractual 
or treaty relationship between the two entities. 
The Switzerland-EC Free Trade Agreement of 1972 was a first step in the 
bilateral agreements. It dismantled trade barriers such as customs and quotas for 
industrial products between the contracting parties, thereby creating a free trade zone.91 
The Insurance Agreement of 1989 between Switzerland and the European 
Community guarantees insurance companies of both parties the freedom to establish 
operations in the territory of the other contracting party.92 
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Amid acclamation about the European Economic Area in 1992, Swiss 
voters rejected the multilateral integration in the inner-European market and voted 
against an adoption of the EU law. In the aftermath of this plebiscite, the bilateral 
approach emerged. The main legal framework was written down in the 1999 and 2004 
treaties, the so-called Bilateral I and II.93 They provide the legal regulations for a sectoral 
political and economic integration without obligations to adopt EU law.94 
As a complement to the Free Trade Agreement, the Bilateral Agreements I 
with the EU involve a further reciprocal opening of markets in six specific areas: free 
movement of persons, technical trade barrier, public procurement, agriculture and air and 
land transport. In addition, the research agreement enables Switzerland to participate in 
EU research programs.95 
The Bilateral Agreements II covers additional economic interests and 
extend cooperation to internal security, asylum, the environment and culture. They 
concern Swiss participation in the Schengen/Dublin Agreement and agreements on 
taxation of savings, processed agricultural products, cooperation in statistics, fighting 
fraud, retirement pensions of EU officials, and Swiss participation in the EU Media 
programs, the Environment Agency and EU education, professional training and youth 
programs.96  
The ecologically motivated parts of the bilateral accord are, with the 
exceptions of the tariff and civil air transport agreements, based on international law. The 
equality of rights is the core principle of the bilateral contracts and follows the consensual 
principle that both parties have to adapt their laws, following the ongoing development of 
the relationship.97 
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In certain fields of security, like the international fight against crime and 
terrorism, Switzerland binds itself with the Schengen and Dublin agreements of 
association to accept the EU law. From the Swiss perspective that means that Switzerland 
has changed its domestic law to harmonize it with certain aspects of EU law. But from 
the EU’s view point it appears that sometimes Switzerland acknowledges EU law as 
binding and sometimes it does not, which leads to a certain inconsistency, depending on 
the point of view. 
To establish an overarching frame for the several bilateral agreements and 
to improve the coordination of the different working groups, Switzerland undertook to 
establish a skeleton agreement with the EU. In December 2008, EU member states agreed 
to such a project, but linked it to a demand that Switzerland take on the agreements of 
association for all bilateral agreements. Such a step would be tantamount to a complete 
adoption of EU law by Switzerland and would lead to the abandonment of the bilateral 
approach, which is an agreement based on international law.98 
The advantage of a skeleton agreement, based on EU law, would be the 
opportunity to define explicitly in which political fields Switzerland wants or does not 
want to participate. But the negotiations are overshadowed by the additional demand of 
the EU that Switzerland cooperate in all political fields. Hence, the political ideas of the 
EU do not match the bilateral approach preferred by Switzerland. The future 
development and feasibility of the bilateralism has to be discussed in the context of these 
facts and circumstances. This context raises essential questions about the potential for a 
future development of the bilateral approach without a skeleton agreement and about the 
meaning of a partial integration if Switzerland would be obliged to adopt the EU law.99 
The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the future development of Swiss-EU 
bilateralism is indirect but decisive. Because of the institutional changes in the EU, 
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Switzerland now finds it much more challenging to cultivate the appropriate direct 
contacts with Brussels decision makers in order to influence the EU’s policy and law 
making. Furthermore the EU’s strengthened self-perception, based on the Lisbon Treaty, 
as an important global player and the nonparticipation of Switzerland in the Treaty 
categorize Switzerland as a “free rider” not willing to share the burden of Europe as a 
whole. That casts a poor light on Switzerland.100 
Whether Switzerland is capable of adapting its established policies to the 
EU’s changed political conditions will be seen in the future debate about bilateralism. 
3. The EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 
The first part of this section concentrates on the institutional development in the 
field of EU foreign and security policy and the modified legal procedures based on the 
Lisbon Treaty. A special aspect is the ratification process.  
a. Institutional Development and Ratification Processes 
The double office of the European Union’s High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy and the Vice President of the European Commission is one 
of the major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. It unifies the responsibility for foreign 
affairs and the oversight of the CFSP. Indeed, the new High Representative is in charge 
of all aspects of the EU’s foreign policy. In addition, she is the head of the council for 
foreign affairs, which is the board for the twenty-seven foreign and defense ministers of 
the member states. As part of the European Council, the CFSP including the CSDP is the 
main institution through which EU member states coordinate actions in such fields as 
human rights, disarmament, and conflict prevention. Different instruments to support 
economical and social transformation processes mainly characterize the common foreign 
policy. The main task of the High Representative is to coordinate the different tools.101 
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The first High Representative is the British politician Catherine Ashton. 
How she will interpret her function is not conclusive yet. She is confronted with a broad 
spectrum of responsibilities. After one year in charge, she seems mainly absorbed with 
international security affairs issues and the EU’s relationship to the global players. 
Maintaining the contractual foreign affairs agreements on a supranational level is not her 
priority, although it would be desirable from the Swiss point of view if she would 
improve her efforts in this area, in her function as Vice President of the European 
Commission. The important aspect is that she has to be the dominating voice of European 
Union’s policy, ensuring a coherent EU foreign policy. 
The newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) is the 
main support instrument for Ashton’s office.102 This organization is responsible for the 
general secretariat of the EU Council and is staffed with diplomats from the member 
states. The contributors to the EEAS coordinate and lead the working groups of the 
Council and represent the EU in various international organizations and for foreign 
affairs. Hence, the EEAS is an important interface to non-European Union countries. 
The European Council, composed of the Heads of State or Government of 
the EU member states, is another important institution. Like the Foreign Affairs Council, 
there is a permanent chairmanship, the President of the European Council. Its function is 
to represent the EU vis-à-vis the ministers of third states; the Council President, together 
with the European Commission President, also represents the EU in the field of the 
foreign economic affairs.103 With the enlargement of the legislative procedure, the 
European Parliament gained the decisive ability to shape international agreements in a 
broad political field. In the area of trade policy, the Parliament is equal to the Council.104 
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The upshot of these organizational changes is a concentration of power in 
Brussels, which has some major consequences for Switzerland. The next section 
summarizes the major consequences for Switzerland and other comparable states and 
outlines some future approaches and concepts. 
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V. CONCLUSION—FUTURE APPROACHES AND CONCEPTS 
A. AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY—THE ACE FOR THE FUTURE? 
This conclusion provides conceptual answers to the six sub-questions asked at the 
outset of this thesis. a.) What are the future challenges of the Swiss foreign and security 
policy? b.) Which strategic factors are decisive in the face of these challenges? c.) What 
is the development potential of cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign and 
security policy? d.) What is the strategic approach of  nation-states comparable to 
Switzerland? e.) What are the costs and benefits of autonomy and sovereignty in the 
system of states and a more closely linked global structure? f.) How might a stronger 
commitment by Switzerland in the formulation and implementation of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) enhance political access for the bilateral approach in 
the present security environment? 
The answers to these questions are integrated in the following different ideas 
presented and proposed by this author. 
National autonomy and sovereignty—the ace for the future? This question, based 
on the study at hand can be answered with a resounding “yes,” as long as international 
cooperation dominates and encapsulation can be avoided. Four decisive parameters 
underline the absolute need for an increase in international cooperation and confirm the 
main statement of this thesis namely, that increasing international cooperation is the key 
to national autonomy: 
• Contemporary threats and risk are not linked to national borders or 
geography; hence they cannot be resolved on the basis of national 
territories or politics 
• Sociological and technological developments in the modern western 
society allow for a very flexible exchange of goods, distribution of 
information, and freedom of movement for people 
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• Sustainable crisis management must happen at the root of the cause and at 
the symptomatic level of regional or national territory or society. Modern 
European values are linked to values and norms, which must be protected 
and perfected through cooperation  
• In an institutionally unified but economically and culturally increasingly 
unstable EU, strong neutral security partners bring real value to the 
European security environment and guarantee stability and security. By 
analyzing Europe’s neutrals the majority are over-average prospering 
states. 
The core of the debate about international cooperation as the solution to maintain national 
autonomy is hence not about the pros and cons of cooperation. The issue is only about 
which form of cooperation and how much. 
B. CONSEQUENCES FOR SWITZERLAND 
The direct links to the High Representative, to the EEAS, and to the President of 
the European Council are part of a network that is essential to the future Swiss-EU 
relationship. Meanwhile, the changed self-perception of the EU, embracing the role of a 
global player, may dramatically diminish the EU’s willingness to negotiate with small, 
nonaligned Switzerland on a bilateral basis. 
The fact that in Switzerland defense policy and foreign affairs are separated in 
two federal ministries further complicates the relationship. However, Ashton’s agenda 
does not foresee a periodic meeting with the Swiss representatives, the real showstopper 
at this point. As an alternative, Switzerland should perhaps focus more on cultivating 
contacts with the deputies of the High Representative and establishing an institutional 
political dialogue with the diplomats of the EEAS. These measures would provide the 
opportunity to set up a consistent link to the second-level decision-makers, which may 
compensate for suboptimal influence with the High Representative. 
In the old system, international and security issues could have been discussed 
separately from bilateral affairs. This situation corresponded to Switzerland’s sectoral 
approach and unburdened the setting of the Swiss priorities. Whether the EU will show 
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some good will for the Swiss bilateral strategy as a quid pro quo for Switzerland’s 
stronger involvement in international affairs and security issues in the field of CSDP will 
become evident in the near future.105 The EU’s view of Switzerland would be more 
favorable if the Swiss were to intensify their substantial contributions in peace 
operations, measured by boots on the ground and not by words and economically 
motivated bilateralism. 
What matters is that Switzerland acts coherently and as a reliable ally. 
Withdrawing from Afghanistan106 and the nonparticipation in the counter-piracy 
operations107 cast a poor light on Switzerland; these steps are not conducive to an 
enhanced EU-Swiss relationship.108 
Generally there are two tendencies that influence the future bilateral development: 
first, the continuously rising pressure on Switzerland to apply EU law; and second, the 
intention of the EU to establish a standardized legal framework for cooperating with non-
European Union neighbors.109 The last aspect is because the very different political and 
economic characteristics are limited to a certain point. State-specific facts, self-chosen 
and imposed opt-outs must be taken into consideration. 
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C. SWISS OPTIONS AND MODELS 
The Lisbon Treaty leaves the intergovernmental decision-making process in the 
field of CFSP substantially unchanged. In the area of CSDP, specifications have been 
added to the Treaty that improve the EU’s position in security and defense policy.
110
 As 
this section shows, the new possibilities and instruments validate the existing concepts 
for conflict prevention and peace-building. This assessment assumes a new dynamic for 
cooperation options.111 Switzerland must decide if it is willing and able to back EU 
doctrine and goals in the CFSP and in particular in the CSDP. 
1. Security and Defense Policy 
Even for the EU member states, the CSDP represents a politically sensitive 
domain, so decisions must follow the principle of unanimity within the EU, and therefore 
fast decisions in the case of international crisis management are to achieve.
112
 This point 
makes the involvement of EU non-member states even more complicated. 
The 2004 draft of the skeleton agreement, the so-called CSDF framework 
convention for the participation of Switzerland in EU-led peace-building and crisis-
prevention operations, is based on a voluntary approach. The convention would help to 
plan and implement the Swiss contributions. 
The EU’s Security and Defense Policy, based on the Lisbon Treaty, contains 
mainly the new common disarmament efforts as well as the tasks for conflict prevention 
and stabilization operations, the Petersberg Plus Tasks.113 In addition, the Lisbon Treaty 
obliges EU member states to improve their national and collective military capabilities, 
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supported by the EDA, founded in 2004. The Lisbon Treaty provides the legal framework 
for a permanent EU military structure and advanced military cooperation.114 
From the aspect of defense policy, the newly established mutual aid clause, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter,115 strengthens the EU’s cooperation in the 
case of an attack on a member state. The “Irish Clause” qualifies mutual aid for neutral 
states. Based on the “Irish Clause,” it would be possible for Switzerland, like other 




2. Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
More significant than the EU’s defense policy for Switzerland is cooperation in 
the field of conflict prevention, peace building and crisis management.
117
 The precise 
definition and the real ambitions of the EU in those tasks remain unclear. The ongoing 
discussion based on the ESS demands additional doctrinal strategies, especially in civil-
military cooperation
118
 and envisages a EU grand strategy.
119
 This overarching plan is 
supposed to define the goals and the criteria for the deployment of the different CSDP 
instruments and should act as a planning tool for all resources and assets. A more 
transparent and generic decision-making process and criteria catalogue would support the 
commitment of third states and nongovernmental organizations to participate in EU-led-
missions and operations. Based on such a detailed strategic layout, Switzerland would be 
able to decide in which areas the EU’s policy conforms to Swiss national interests. Such a 
measure would help to provide a clear statement of how Switzerland intends to support 
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the EU’s efforts. A stronger consultation and information exchange between the EU and 
Switzerland would be a basic requirement for such a course of action. 
3. Concepts and Instruments 
The whole structure of the EU itself as well as the treaty relationship between 
Switzerland and the EU are very complex and shaped by the huge bureaucracy of the 
administration and lawmakers in Brussels and by the Swiss bilateral approach. The new 
concept and instruments for closer cooperation in security and defense policy must follow 
simple principles and fulfill a high practical relevance to facilitate the Swiss internal 
political agreement process. 
Switzerland would do well to develop policies comparable to those articulated in 
the EU’s strategy papers. Clear definitions of the national interests in peace building and 
crisis management, including a geopolitical dimension, should be part of such a 
strategy.
120
 A detailed list of the military and civil capabilities and a criteria catalogue 
analogous to a checklist would help to assess the potential for Swiss participation in EU-
led-missions. Such an instrument would help to improve Swiss reliability and would 
simplify the coordination of cooperation with the EU. But Switzerland has mainly 
resisted doing so because of uncertainty as to whether such steps would be compatible 
with the Swiss definition of neutrality. 
4. An Idea: European Neutrals Partnership for Security 
NATO’s PfP must be seen as a phase-out model because most of the leading 
central and eastern European states for which PfP was created will become NATO 
members in the near future, stay neutral or develop other needs for security and defense 
cooperation. Hence the intention of PfP as a stabilizing, integrating and training 
organization in the aftermath of the Cold War has accomplished its purpose. By 
analyzing the European security environment one can argue that the time has come for a 
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new organization, which provides new options for international cooperation in the field 
of security and defense policy should be established. The author proposes the idea of a 
European Neutrals Partnership for Security (ENPS) in close cooperation with CSDP and 
NATO but organizationally detached, alliance free and committed to the policy and law 
of neutrality with the main goal to provide substantial contributions to the European 
security. This organization must not be seen as just another additional player or yet 
another parallel organization to existing cooperation arrangements. The ENPS would be 
capable to bring together and coordinate the contribution of Europe’s neutral states vis-à-
vis the non-neutrals and alliance members. The ENPS would provide a new strategic 
platform and tool not only for its neutral member states but also for CSDP as well as for 
NATO to play with the whole spectrum between hard and soft power. With the positive 
side effect to strengthens the influence of Europe’s neutrals on one hand and to make 
them discharge to their duties, mutual responsibility and burden sharing at the other hand. 
The potential creation of the ENPS should go beyond the existing structures of the 
PfP and provide a consistent new approach by adapting parts of the PfP concept but 
completely detached from NATO as complementary organization to NATO and CSDP. 
This approach offers the chances to solve crisis management challenges in a new way 
Europe’s neutrals could bundle their forces and provide their help in a more efficient and 
in the end, more effective way. Because resources in the field of security and defense 
policy are very overstretched in most neutral states in Europe, it cannot be assumed that 
new funds and means would be allocated for the concept of ENPS. Hence a resource 
transfer from PfP would not just be essential but politically and strategically appropriate 
and desirable to set a political signal. 
D. CONCLUSION 
An additional change in the legal framework of the EU is not yet in sight. The 
integration process has reached a certain culmination, not the least because of the 
financial crisis, and the strain on the single currency and its political fall out—further 
steps are not pending on the political agenda. As a consequence for Switzerland, the 
Lisbon Treaty is the major agreement for future political definition and the development 
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of the Swiss relationship to the EU. In the event, this treaty does not advance the bilateral 
approach; instead, it actually puts some additional stones on a path that is already paved 
with obstacles. 
The strategic goal for Switzerland must be to improve its direct links to the high-
level opinion leaders and decision makers in the EU. For that, the Swiss must refresh 
their pre-existing contacts and participation in working groups in the European 
Commission and establish new associates in the Council and Parliament. Switzerland 
must work out a clear political roadmap covering all its national interests to be prepared 
to face the further negotiations with the EU. 
A three-level approach would be a feasible way to manage the political relations 
with the EU. First, an institutional political-strategic dialog with the European 
Commission would establish a certain commitment and confidence. Second, walk the 
talk: A stronger participation in the broad field of the CSDP would build up some 
credibility for the Swiss in other fields, including economic policy, an ace that would 
help the Swiss to protect their national interests despite certain sectoral disagreements. 
Third, the Swiss should not overplay their call for a special treatment. Wherever possible, 
bilateralism must be based on existing instruments and mechanisms. Special solutions 
must be confident to decisions, which are absolutely essential for the sovereign survival 
of Switzerland, and may not become the predominant features in a bilateral convention. 
A stronger commitment of Switzerland in the formulation and implementation of the 
CSDP would enhance political access for the bilateral approach. 
The overarching question of this thesis—how much autonomy is desirable and 
how much international cooperation is needed to protect and advance Swiss national 
interests—is a debate about the concept of the nation-state itself. Swiss political strategy 
and decisions clearly demonstrate Switzerland’s intention to pursue its national solo 
course as a non-EU state and its commitment to its sovereignty—even as the 
Confederacy becomes increasingly, if selectively, involved in the institutions of European 
politics, particularly security and defense. This thesis has shown that these goals are not 
mutually exclusive or even in logical conflict.  In fact, while Switzerland feels challenged 
to assert itself against the normative forces of globalization and unification—for example 
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EU law—it has, so far, successfully engaged the multilateral organizations of Europe and 
the West. Although the EU’s post-Lisbon agenda of increased internal integration 
requires Switzerland to reconsider the way it approaches the EU and its component 
member states, now is not the time to step back from this successful strategy.  A flexible 
approach based on mutual interests is and will be the future of the coexistence for the EU 
and Switzerland—autonomy and liberty by cooperation. 
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